


















We study optimal policy in an economy in which public debt is used as collateral or liquidity buffer.
Issuing more public debt raises welfare by easing the underlying financial friction; but this easing
lowers the liquidity premium and increases the government’s cost of borrowing. These considera-
tions, which are absent in the basic Ramsey paradigm, help pin down a unique, long-run level of
public debt. They require a front-loaded tax response to government-spending shocks, instead of tax
smoothing. And they explain why a financial recession, more than a traditional one, makes govern-
ment borrowing cheaper, optimally supporting larger fiscal stimuli.
*This paper supersedes an earlier draft, entitled “Optimal Public Debt Management and Liquidity Provision”, which was
concerned with the same topic but did not contain the present paper’s theoretical contribution. We are grateful to Behzad Diba
for his collaboration on the earlier project; to Pedro Teles and Per Krusell for illuminating discussions; and to various seminar
participants for their feedback. Angeletos also thanks the University of Bern, Study Center Gerzensee, and the Swiss Finance
Institute for their hospitality.
1 Introduction
Liquidity shocks and shortages of private collateral interfere with the efficient allocation of resources.
A theoretical literature has emphasized that public debt issuance may ease such frictions by contribut-
ing to the supply of assets that can be used as collateral or buffer stock (Woodford, 1990; Aiyagari and
McGrattan, 1998; Holmström and Tirole, 1998). In the same spirit, an empirical literature has shown
that, even after controlling for default risk, the spread between government and private bonds is both
substantial and sensitive to the quantity of public debt (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012;
Greenwood and Vayanos, 2014).
What are the implications of these considerations for optimal fiscal policy? Do they lead to a well-
defined optimal long-term target for public debt and, if yes, what are its determinants? How do they
matter for the optimal policy response to fiscal shocks or other business cycle shocks?
To address these questions, we augment the basic Ramsey paradigm (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey,
1983; Aiyagari et al., 2002) with a liquidity function for public debt as suggested by the aforementioned
literature. In our model, public debt’s use as collateral helps ease the reallocation of a consumption good
across households, or of capital across firms. Such reallocation is necessary because of idiosyncratic
taste or productivity shocks. Tractability is nevertheless preserved by use of a quasi-linear specification
as in Lagos and Wright (2005). We are thus able to reduce the planner’s problem in our economy to an
analytically solvable, albeit non-convex, optimal control problem, in which it is as if public debt enters
(i) the utility or the production function and (ii) the interest-rate cost of government borrowing.
The optimal policy, both in the long and the short run, is dictated by the interplay of three forces. The
first is the desire to smooth taxes. The second is the desire to ease the financial friction so as to improve
private allocations. The third, which is perhaps the most novel element of our analysis, is the desire to
preserve the financial friction so as to suppress the interest-rate cost of public debt.
The relative importance of these three forces varies across the short and the long run. The trade
off between improving the private sector’s allocations and keeping the government’s interest-rate costs
low is the key determinant of the steady-state level of public debt. But tax smoothing naturally gains
influence when considering transition to the steady state or the optimal response to shocks.
Consider first the long run. In our model, the government could eliminate the financial friction by
issuing a sufficiently large amount of public debt to satiate the economy’s demand for collateral. But
doing so would have adverse budgetary consequences as it would eliminate the “profit” that the govern-
ment enjoys by paying an interest rate on public debt that is below the underlying social discount rate.
Crucially, this trade off hinges, not merely on taxation being distortionary, but also on the fact that the
price of public debt varies negatively with its quantity: in the absence of this effect, the optimal quantity
of public debt converges in the long run to the level that satiates the economy’s demand for collateral.1
1This presumes, for the sake of the argument, that the satiation level is lower than the maximal sustainable level of debt.
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This trade off can support a unique steady-state level of debt to which the economy converges for
any initial position below satiation. This contrasts with the steady-state indeterminacy –induced by tax
smoothing, in the standard model. Furthermore, there is a threshold strictly above satiation such that,
for initial levels of debt in between these two, it is optimal to reduce debt below satiation. This illustrates
the importance of the interest-rate suppression motive: the government may optimally create a shortage
of collateral in an economy where collateral was initially abundant.
The same motive also figures prominently in the optimal response to shocks. Consider, for instance,
an unanticipated, uninsured, positive shock to government spending. In the basic Ramsey paradigm,
this triggers a permanent increase in taxes by an amount equal to the annualized innovation in the
present discounted value of government spending. In our setting, instead, taxes increase relatively more
early on in order to keep interest rates on debt low, enabling a smaller tax burden later on.
In a similar vein, consider a shock that raises the labor wedge, reduces aggregate output and tax
revenue, and motivates a fiscal stimulus in the form of a temporary “payroll tax cut” to moderate the
increase in the labor wedge. Suppose also that the resulting recession is associated—exogenously or
endogenously—with more severe financial frictions. This has an ambiguous effect on the trade-off be-
tween liquidity provision and interest-rate suppression: while the larger friction encourages greater pro-
vision of liquidity, the higher profit that the planner can make by preserving the shortage of collateral
pulls in the opposite direction. But it unambiguously increases fiscal space by reducing the interest rate
on public debt, thereby supporting a larger fiscal stimulus.
This result provides a formal basis for the proposal, made by, among others, Paul Krugman and Brad
DeLong, that the Great Recession called for high deficits not only because of the need to stimulate aggre-
gate demand but also because the low interest rates made it “cheap” for the US government to borrow.
This proposal has no place in the textbook Ramsey paradigm, because the price of the bonds coincides
with the social discount factor. But it makes sense through the lenses of our analysis insofar as a lower
interest rate is a signal of a heightened shortage of collateral and, hence, of a higher spread between the
market price of public debt and the underlying social discount factor. From this perspective, a broader
contribution of our paper is to draw attention to the policy implications of both the cyclicality of this
spread and its endogeneity to the quantity of public debt.
Turning to the technical contribution of this paper, we highlight that, when the interest rate on pub-
lic debt increases with its level, the policy problem becomes non-convex. As a result, the standard
first-order approach does not apply: there can exist multiple paths that satisfy the planner’s Euler and
transversality conditions, and the challenge is to find out which one of them is truly optimal.2 An inte-
gral part of our contribution is to address this challenge by adapting the methods of Skiba (1978). This
2The non-convexity of the problem also explains why, in general, there can exist multiple steady states below satiation. We
avoid this complication in the main analysis, and guarantee the existence of a unique such steady state, by making appropriate
assumptions on the problem’s primitives. But we also explain why and how our main insights survive more broadly.
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allows sharp analytical results, in contrast to Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), who rely on numerical sim-
ulations, abstract from transitional dynamics and shocks, and, as explained in Section 4.1, mis-measure
the shadow cost of government debt.
2 Micro-foundations
This section describes a micro-founded economy in which public debt serves as collateral and helps
improve the allocation of resources. We characterize the equilibrium for given policy and show how the
optimal policy problem nests in the class of reduced-form problems analyzed in the next section. We
also illustrate the policy conflict between liquidity provision and interest-rate suppression.
2.1 Setup
There is a unit-mass of ex-ante identical households, indexed by i ∈ [0,1], and a representative firm. Time
is discrete, indexed by t ∈ {0,1,2, . . .}, and each period is split into a “morning” and an “afternoon.” There
are two edible goods. The one is the (exogenous) fruit of a tree, which becomes ripe in the morning of
each period. The other is the (endogenous) output of the representative firm, which is produced in the
afternoon with the labor of the households. Each good has to be consumed in the sub-period in which it
is produced, or else it perishes. We refer to the first good as the “morning good” and to the second one,
which is also our numeraire, as “the afternoon good.” Idiosyncratic risk takes the form of taste shocks
to the utility of the morning good. The associated first-best allocation is impeded by a financial friction.
This friction can be eased by saving in a riskless bond, whose supply is controlled by the government.
The representative firm. The representative firm is competitive and produces the afternoon good us-
ing labor. Aggregate output is given by yt = Aht , where ht denotes the labor input and A denotes the
exogenous aggregate productivity (assumed to be time-invariant for the time being). It follows that, in
equilibrium, the pre-tax wage is given by wt = A and all income goes to labor.
The households. Consider a household i . Let hi t ∈R+ denote her period-t labor supply, and let xi t ∈R+
and ci t ∈R denote her period-t consumption of, respectively, the morning and the afternoon good. Her




βtU (ci t , xi t ,hi t ;θi t )
]
. (1)
β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor, θi t is an idiosyncratic taste shock, and U is given by
U (c, x,h;θ) ≡ c +θu(x)−ν(h), (2)
where u is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and ν is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
The taste shock is i.i.d. across households and follows a continuous Markov process, with transition
density ϕ(θ′|θ), unconditional density ϕ(θ), and support [θ,θ]. Its modeling role is to introduce a desire
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for trade: high-θ agents would like to buy the morning good from low-θ agents. As we explain next, such
trades are impeded by a financial friction—and this is where public debt enters the picture as a form
of buffer stock or collateral. Finally, the linearity of U in c plays the same role as in Lagos and Wright
(2005): it guarantees that the cross-sectional distribution of wealth is not a relevant state variable for the
aggregate equilibrium dynamics and the planner’s problem.
Markets and frictions. In the afternoon of each period, households can buy and sell a risk-free asset,
which delivers one unit of the numeraire good in the afternoon of the following period. This asset, whose
price is denoted by qt , may be issued either by the government or by other private agents: government
and private bonds are perfect substitutes. In addition, households can trade short-term IOUs in each
morning. These IOUs facilitate the transfer of resources within the period.
Let ai t denote household i ’s holdings of the risk-free asset—also, its net financial worth—in the be-
ginning of period t . The period-t budget constraint can then be expressed as follows:
ci t +pt xi t +qt ai t+1 = ai t + (1−τt )wt hi t +pt ē (3)
where pt is the price of the morning good and ē is the fixed endowment of it.
Let zi t = pt (xi t − ē) denote the value, in terms of the numeraire, of the household’s net trade of the
morning good. One can interpret zi t as short-term (intra-period) credit lines that help cover “liquidity
needs.” When zi t > 0, the household is a “borrower” in the sense that it finances its net purchase of the
morning good by issuing an IOU against its afternoon labor income; and conversely, the household is a
“lender” when zi t < 0.
Once the afternoon arrives, a borrower may be tempted to renege on her promise to pay back. If she
does so, her lenders can confiscate a fraction ξ ∈ (0,1) of the her labor income as well as all of her assets.
For default to be averted in equilibrium, the following constraint must therefore hold:
zi t ≤ ξwt hde fi t +ai t (4)
where hde fi t denotes labor supply in the (off-equilibrium) event of default. Applying the same logic to
inter-period borrowing, we get:
−ai t+1 ≤ ξwt+1hde fi t+1. (5)
Condition (5) represents an upper bound on the agent’s debt, or equivalently on her net supply of the
risk-free asset. Condition (4), on the other hand, shows how holdings of the risk-free asset serve as col-
lateral in the IOU market, therefore enabling trade of the morning good.3
3By assumption, the risk-free asset is traded only in the afternoon. But because it can be posted as collateral, the equilibrium
allocations remain unaffected if we let it be traded in the morning alongside, or in place of the IOUs. Accordingly, we can think
of the risk-free asset interchangeably as collateral and as buffer stock.
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The government. The government’s budget constraint is given by
bt + g = qt bt+1 +τt wt ht (6)
where bt is the stock of public debt inherited from period t −1, g is the exogenous level of government
spending, wt ht is labor income, and τt is the tax rate. For any given b0, the government chooses the




βt (ci t +θi t u(xi t )−ν(hi t ))
]
,
subject to its budget constraint and the applicable equilibrium restrictions (to be derived next).
2.2 Equilibrium
We characterize the equilibrium in three steps. First, we study the individual’s problem and derive the
private value of liquidity for a given sequence of prices and policies, {pt , qt ,τt ,bt }∞t=0. Second, we solve
for the equilibrium prices {pt , qt }∞t=0 and derive the social value of liquidity. Finally, we show how to
represent all the objects that enter the planner’s problem as functions of the sequence {τt ,bt } alone.
Let us start by determining the pledgeable income of the household. This raises the question of what
tax rate the household would face in the event of default. Since default is an off -equilibrium object, the
associated tax rate can differ from the on-equilibrium tax rate τt . Without serious loss of generality, we
assume that it is zero. Along with the fact that a fraction ξ of labor income is confiscated by lenders, this
implies that labor supply under default solves ν′(hde fi t ) = (1−ξ)wt . Using wt = A, we conclude that the
financial constraints (4) and (5) can be restated as, respectively,
zi t ≤φ+ai t and ai t ≥−φ,
where φ≡ ξA(ν′)−1((1−ξ)A).4
We now proceed to study how the financial friction gives rise to a private value for liquidity. The





subject to p(x − ē) ≤φ+a
Clearly, for given p, the constraint is binding ex post when θ is high enough relative to a. By the same
token, a higher a means a smaller ex ante chance that the collateral constrain will bind. This explains
the precise sense in which there is a precautionary motive and the precise source of the equilibrium pre-
mium on public debt. Public debt is priced at a premium because it helps ease the collateral constraint.
4We henceforth treat A, ξ, and φ as constants and do not show the dependence of all endogenous objects on them. Also
note that φ is strictly concave in ξ, with a maximum obtained at an interior ξ̄ ∈ (0,1). We assume ξ < ξ̄ and think of a tighter
constraint as, interchangeably, a higher ξ or a higher φ.
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be the discounted, previous-period expectation of this maximum, and let c̃i t ≡ ci t + zi t . We can recast
the household’s problem as follows:
max






c̃i t −ν(hi t )+ ũ
(
ai t+1,θi t , pt+1
))]
(7)
subject to c̃i t +qt ai t+1 = ai t + (1−τt )wt hi t and ai t+1 ≥−φ
It is therefore as if individual asset holdings entered the utility function.
For given θ and p, ũ(a,θ, p) is strictly increasing and concave in a if the next-period constraint is
binding with positive probability, and constant otherwise. The following Euler condition is therefore
necessary and sufficient for ai t+1 to be optimal:
ũa(ai t+1,θi t , pt+1) ≤ qt −β≡πt , (8)
with equality whenever ai t+1 >−φ.
Because ũa is equal to the expected value of the Lagrange multiplier on the morning collateral con-
straint, this condition means that each agent saves as much as it takes to equate the expected shadow
value of collateral, or the return to liquidity, with the spread πt , or the cost of liquidity. More succinctly,
the aggregation of this condition across agents gives the aggregate demand for liquidity as a decreasing
function of πt+1. And because the aggregate supply of liquidity is given by bt+1, we expect a higher bt+1
to map in equilibrium to a lower πt , as well as to a more efficient allocation of the morning good and
hence higher welfare. This intuition is incomplete because it does not take into account the endogeneity
of pt+1, but as the next proposition shows the essence remains the same.
Proposition 1. There exist functions π,V and a scalar bbl i ss such that the following is true:
(i) For any policy path {τt ,bt+1}, the equilibrium price of public debt is given by
qt =β+π(bt+1)




βt [ct −ν(ht )+V (bt+1)] . (9)
(ii) For b < bbl i ss , π(b) > 0, V (b) < Vbli ss , and V (b) is increasing in b; and for b ≥ bbl i ss , π(b) = 0 and
V (b) =Vbl i ss , where Vbli ss is the value of E[θu(x)] obtained at the first-best allocation of the morning good.
In a nutshell, V (b) captures how much public debt contributes to social welfare by easing the friction
and improving the allocation of the morning good, whereas π(b) measures the price that the typical
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agent is willing to pay for the services provided. Finally, bbl i ss identifies the “satiation” level of public
debt, or aggregate collateral, above which the friction ceases to bind and, as a result, V ′(b) =π(b) = 0.
For b < bbli ss , the private and the social value of liquidity are both positive—but they are not equal to
each other, due to the pecuniary externality emerging from the dependence of the collateral constraint
on the price of the morning good. This helps illustrate the potential robustness of our main lessons
to pecuniary externalities a la Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Lorenzoni (2008) and Dávila (2015).5 At the
same time, the existence of the satiation point, although neither realistic nor strictly needed, allows us to
illustrate that the planner may optimally choose to manufacture a shortage of collateral, that is, to lead
the economy below bbli ss even if it starts above it.
2.3 The reduced-form policy problem
The government’s problem consists of finding the sequence
{
ct ,ht ,τt , qt ,bt+1
}∞
t=0 that maximizes (9)
subject to the following four constraints:
qt bt+1 = bt + g −τt Aht (10)
qt = β+π(bt+1) (11)
ν′(ht ) = (1−τt )A (12)
ct + g = Aht (13)
The first is the government’s budget constraint; the second is the bond pricing condition; the third is the
labor supply condition; and the last one is the economy’s resource constraint.
This problem is equivalent to that of a representative-agent economy in which public debt generates
a welfare flow of V (b) and is priced at q =β+π(b). The dependence of V and π on b epitomizes the dual
role of public debt in easing the trading friction (the effect captured by V ) and manipulating interest rates
(the effect captured by π). How this dual role, in combination with the desire to smooth taxes, shapes
the optimal policy is the subject of Section 3.
To ease that transition to that section, we further simplify the government’s problem as follows. Let
H(τ) ≡ (ν′)−1 (1−τA ) and S(τ) ≡ τAH(τ) denote the equilibrium values of, respectively, labor supply and tax
revenue, as functions of the tax rate. It is straightforward to check that S is single-peaked—i.e., there is a
Laffer curve—and attains its maximum value, s̄, at τ= τ̄ for some τ̄ ∈ (0,1). For any s ≤ s̄, the tax rate that
raises revenue s is therefore given by τ= T (s) ≡ min{τ : S(τ) = s}. Next, let U (s) ≡ AH(T (s))−ν(H(T (s)))
measure the equilibrium utility from consumption and leisure as a function of s and note that this is
decreasing and concave in s, reflecting the distortionary effect of taxation. The government’s problem
can be re-expressed as follows:
5In Appendix B, we show that π(b) >V ′(b), i.e., there is a negative externality. Intuitively, when an agent decides how much
to save, she does not internalize how her enhanced ability to buy the morning good will increase its price, tightening the others’
constraints. That said, our main results in Section 3 allow π(b) and V ′(b) to be unequal in the opposite direction.
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Proposition 2. Let the functions V , π, and U be defined as above. The optimal policy path for taxes and





βt [U (st )+V (bt+1)] (14)
subject to q(bt+1)bt+1 = bt + g − st (15)
where q(b) ≡β+π(b).
2.4 Liquidity provision versus interest-rate suppression
To build some intuition about the key trade-off faced by the policymaker, let us momentarily consider a
two-period version of the problem described in Proposition 2. Suppose further that the economy starts
with zero debt and that any debt issued at t = 1 has to be retired at t = 2. Finally, abstract from optimal
taxation and let some exogenous scalars λ1 and λ2 measure the value of tax revenue in periods t = 1 and
t = 2, respectively. These are effectively the Lagrange multipliers on the respective budget constraints,
except that they are treated as exogenous in the present exercise (but not in the main analysis).







The first term captures the benefit of relaxing the budget at t = 1. The second term captures the benefit
of easing the financial friction at t = 2. The last term captures the tax burden of retiring the debt at t = 2 .
Suppose now that λ1 = λ2 = λ. This amounts to imposing tax smoothing as in Barro (1979) and let
us proxy within the present two-period exercise what goes on in the steady state of our infinite-horizon






The first term captures the social value of the “liquidity services” of public debt, that is, the welfare gain
from easing the financial friction. The second term captures the “profit” the government makes by pro-
viding these services.
This profit reminds seigniorage in monetary models. Here, it emerges because, and only because,
there is a wedge between the interest rate the government has to pay on public debt and the underlying
social discount rate. In the textbook paradigm (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983), this wedge is zero,
implying that the planner sees neither a profit nor a cost to issuing an extra unit of debt. In our setting,
by contrast, the financial friction depresses the interest rate below the social discount rate. This in turn
explains the precise sense in which public debt is “cheap” when rates are low.
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Had the government cared only about this profit, it would have set b = bseig ≡ argmaxb π(b)b < bbliss.
At the other extreme, had the government cared only about “social surplus,” as measured by V (b), it
would have set b = bbliss. Here, the government strikes a balance between these two extremes, i.e., bseig <
b∗ < bbliss, because it values lowering financial frictions but also enjoying fiscal space. The stronger the
fiscal preoccupation, as measured by λ, the closer b∗ is to the “profit-maximizing” point bseig.
In Appendix E, we use an example (with two types and log utility for the morning good) to obtain
a closed-form solution for V and π and a sharper characterization of the determinants of b∗. We show,
inter alia, that when borrowing constraints are relaxed, causing the premium π to fall, the planner may
find it optimal to issue less public debt in order to moderate the fall in π. This anticipates our analysis in
Section 5 of how the desire to increase fiscal space by manipulating the government’s cost of borrowing
shapes the optimal policy response to shocks.
Clearly, such fiscal considerations are present only because taxation is distortionary. But it is impor-
tant to recognize that distortionary taxation alone does not suffice to make b∗ < bbliss : had the interest
rate on public debt been the same as the social discount rate, the government would have chosen to
flood the economy with liquidity regardless of how large the welfare cost of taxation is. Formally, when
π = 0, the terms λ1q(b)b and βλ2b in the objective of problem (16) cancel out, Ω reduces to V , and the
government chooses b = bbliss regardless of λ.
The relevant trade off is therefore not liquidity provision versus distortionary taxation but rather liq-
uidity provision versus interest-rate suppression: preserving the shortage of aggregate collateral makes
sense only because it helps suppress the interest rate on public debt.
This insight is key for understanding the properties of optimal policy established in this paper. But
while the two-period example has helped put the spotlight on the aforementioned two policy objectives
(liquidity provision and interest-rate suppression), it has abstracted from the question of how these ob-
jectives interact with that of tax smoothing. It also cannot distinguish between the short and the long
run, the transition between the two, and the optimal response to shocks. We address these limitations
and offer a complete and precise characterization of the optimal policy in the rest of the paper.
3 Optimal Policy
In Appendix A we obtain the analogue to Proposition 2 in a model that has the financial friction dis-
tort the allocation of capital and thereby also reduce aggregate productivity, in the spirit of Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) and Holmström and Tirole (1998). While the precise channels via which public debt in-
fluences welfare and interest rates (or V and π) change, the essence of the policy problem remains the
same. With this in mind, in this section we suppress the micro-foundations and focus on solving the
reduced-form problem appearing in Proposition 2.
This task is complicated by the non-convexity of the problem. This complication cannot be simply
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assumed away, for it is inherent to the interest-rate effects of public debt and therefore to the trade off we
wish to study.6 To address this complication and complete the task at hand, we reformulate the policy
problem in continuous time and adapt the methods of Skiba (1978).
3.1 Continuous-time formulation
Let s̄ > 0 be the maximal possible tax revenue, or the peak of the Laffer curve, let s ≤ 0 be an arbitrary
lower bound, and let b̄ ≡ s̄−gρ > 0. We henceforth consider the following continuous-time version of the
problem obtained in Proposition 2.




e−ρt [U (s)+V (b)]dt (18)
subject to ḃ = R(b)b + g − s ∀t (19)
with initial condition b(0) = b0, for some b0 ∈ [0, b̄) and for R(b) ≡ ρ−π(b).
We impose the following restrictions, which are consistent with but not limited to the micro-foundations
presented in the previous section:
Main Assumptions. [A1] U , V , and π are continuously differentiable.
[A2] U is concave in s, with a maximum attained at s = 0.
[A3] There exists a threshold bbliss ∈ (0, b̄) such that V ′(b) > 0 and π(b) > 0 for all b < bbliss, and V ′(b) =
0 and π(b) = 0 for all b > bbliss.
[A4] π(b) ≤ ρ for all b.
A1 is technical. A2 and A3 mirror the properties established in our micro-founded setting. In partic-
ular, A2 means that the welfare cost of taxation is convex, while A3 captures the dual role of the financial
friction on welfare and interest rates. A3 also imposes that the level of public debt that satiates the econ-
omy’s demand for collateral is sustainable, a property that is not strictly needed but makes the analysis
more interesting. Finally, A4 restricts the interest rate to be non-negative, an assumption that is not
strictly needed but simplifies the exposition.
3.2 The Euler condition and the economics behind it
Denote the costate variable with λ and consider the Hamiltonian of the problem:
H(s,b,λ) ≡U (s)+V (b)+λ[s − (ρ−π(b))b − g ] .
6Indeed, even if V (b) happens to be concave, and even if π(b)b is concave over the region b ∈ (0,bbli ss ), non-convexity
emerges from the fact that the “profit” π(b)b switches from positive for b < bbli ss to zero for b > bbl i ss .
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This can be rewritten as
H(s,b,λ) =U (s)+λ[s −ρb − g ]+Ω(b,λ).
Similarly to Section 2.4, Ω(b,λ) ≡ V (b)+λπ(b)b measures the social value of the liquidity services of
public debt plus the profit made from providing these services, and λ measures the shadow value of tax
revenue. But whereas in that section we treated λ as exogenous and assumed it to be constant over time,
here we let it evolve endogenously.
Given λ, the optimal s (equivalently, the optimal τ) solves U ′(s)+λ= 0. Let s(λ) denote the solution
to this equation. The Euler condition can then be expressed as λ̇= ρλ+Hb(b,λ, s(λ)), or equivalently
λ̇ = Ωb(b,λ). (20)
In a steady state, this condition reduces to Ωb(b,λ) = 0. This suggests that a steady state of our dy-
namic problem is akin to the solution of the static problem studied in Section 2.4. We will later verify
that this intuition is correct, subject though to the following qualification: unless we strengthen our as-
sumptions about π and V , there can exist multiple steady states, each one associated with a different λ
and hence also with a different “static” solution argmaxbΩ(b,λ).
Away from steady state, condition (20) equates λ̇ with Ωb . The former encapsulates the welfare cost
of departing from tax smoothing; the latter captures the dual effect of the quantity of public debt on
welfare and interest rates. Condition (20) therefore means that, along the transition to a steady state, the
optimal policy balances not only the two objectives we emphasized before—namely liquidity provision
and interest-rate suppression—but also the traditional objective of smoothing tax distortions over time.
Intuitively, when Ωb is positive, there is value to increasing public debt, which means raising taxes
tomorrow relative to today. (And the converse is true if Ωb is negative.) If this tilt in the time profile
of taxes were of no consequence for welfare, the government would move to the steady state instanta-
neously. The desire to smooth taxes therefore acts as some sort of an adjustment cost that slows down
convergence to the steady state.
In fact, the desire to smooth taxes not only influences the rate of convergence to the relevant steady
state but may also tie this steady state to initial conditions. We will see a sharp version of this point below
in the form of a threshold for the initial level of debt such that the economy converges to a steady state
without satiation if and only if it starts below this threshold.7
3.3 Steady state(s) and transitional dynamics
A caveat to some of the intuition provided above is that, like the Euler condition upon which they are
based, they rely on local arguments. Such arguments are not only necessary but also sufficient for op-
7This discussion also underscores the intertwining of the optimal provision of liquidity and tax smoothing. As mentioned in
the Introduction, this intertwining is a key high-level difference between our analysis and the literature on Friedman rule. We
expand on this point in Appendix C.3.
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timality in convex optimization problems but not in our problem. We need additional arguments to
identify the global optimum among multiple local optima that satisfy both the Euler condition and the
transversality condition.
A formal treatment of this issue and a general solution are found in Appendix B. Here, we simplify
the exposition by imposing the following restrictions on the problem’s primitives.
Auxiliary Assumptions. [B1] The ratio V ′(b)/π(b) is a constant ω.
[B2] The elasticity σ(b) ≡−π′(b)b/π(b) is increasing in b ∈ (0,bbliss).
[B3] The level of government spending, g , is sufficiently large.
B1 imposes that the wedge between the social and the private value of collateral is invariant to b;
this nests the special case in which the social and private value of liquidity coincide (i.e., π = V ′). B2
guarantees that π(b)b is single-peaked, achieving its maximum at some bseign ∈ (0,bbliss), that is, there is
a Laffer curve in terms of b as well as in terms of τ. Finally, B3 guarantees that there is a sufficiently large
shadow value for depressing the government’s cost of borrowing. Together, these assumptions lead to
the following sharp characterization of the optimal debt dynamics.8
Theorem 1. There exists unique (bskiba,b∗, s∗), with bseign < b∗ < bbliss < bskiba and 0 < s∗ < s̄, such that:
(i) For b0 < bskiba, optimal debt and taxes converge monotonically to, respectively, b∗ and s∗.
(ii) For b0 ≥ bskiba, optimal debt and taxes stay constant at their initial levels.
This result identifies b∗ as the unique steady-state level of public debt below satiation, and bskiba as
the critical threshold for the initial level of debt below which the economy converges to this steady state.
Above this threshold, the economy instead rests for ever at its initial point.9
A detailed proof of this result is provided in Appendix B. Here, we sketch out the main ideas with the
help of the phase diagram in Figure 1.
To start with, consider the ḃ = 0 locus. This corresponds to balanced budget, or the value of λ (equiv-
alently, the rate of taxation) that solves s(λ) = g + (ρ−π(b))b. It is illustrated by the curve labeled “ḃ = 0”
in the figure. This curve is upward slopping because a higher level of debt requires a higher rate of taxa-
tion (equivalently, a higher λ) for the budget to be balanced.10
8The micro-foundation of B1 and B2 is an open question. But since our main lessons survive without them, in the sense
described later, we do not find it necessary to search for such micro-foundations. Also note that we do not restrict V to be
concave because it would no have helped eliminate the non-convexity of the problem.
9This threshold is an example of the “Skiba points” that emerge in non-convex, optimal control problems. These points
separate the state space in different sub-regions, each one corresponding to the basin of attraction of a different steady state. A
peculiarity of the particular problem studied here is that every point above bski ba is itself a steady state, mirroring the contin-
uum of steady states in Barro (1979).
10To be precise, this monotonicity holds if and only if the cost of debt, Rb = (ρ−π(b))b, is increasing in b, which is necessarily
the case in regions M and H of Figure 1 but may fail in region L. However, the result presented here are not unsettled by this
possibility, because it is always optimal to move the economy outside region L and into region M.
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Next, consider the λ̇ = 0 locus. There are three scenarios to consider here, corresponding to the
regions L, M and H in the figure.
In region L, which is defined by b < bseign, increasing b raises both π(b)b and V (b), so there is no
trade off between “liquidity provision” and “interest rate manipulation.” It follows that, for any λ≥ 0, the
marginal value of raising debt is positive, Ωb(b,λ) > 0, and therefore also λ̇ > 0. That is, the locus λ̇ = 0
does not exist in region L.11 By direct implication, there is also no steady state within this region.
In region M, which is defined by b ∈ (bseign,bbliss), increasing b raises V (b) at the expense of reducing
π(b)b, so the aforementioned trade off is now active. Which of the two sides of the trade off, liquidity pro-
vision or interest-rate suppression, dominates depends on how large the shadow value of government
resources, λ, is. Holding b constant, a large enough λ tilts the balance in favor of interest-rate suppres-
sion and maps to λ̇ =Ωb(b,λ) < 0. Conversely, λ̇ =Ωb(b,λ) < 0 for λ small enough. By the same token,
for any b ∈ (bseign,bbliss), there exists a critical value of λ = γ(b) such that Ωb(b,γ(b)) = 0. This gives the
curve labeled “λ̇= 0” in Figure 1.
This curve is decreasing, reflecting the idea that a higher λ shifts the balance in favor of interest-rate
suppression (i.e., its brings argmaxΩ closer to argmaxπ(b)b). The balanced-budget line, on the other
hand, is increasing, reflecting the higher tax distortion implied by higher level of debt. It follows that
the two lines intersect at a unique point (b,λ) = (b∗,λ∗), which identifies the unique steady state within
regions L and M . To the left of this point, debt and taxes increase over time; and to the right of it, debt
and taxes fall over time.
Finally, consider region H, which corresponds to levels of debt above satiation. In this region, we
have that both V (b) =Vbliss and π(b)b = 0, so Ωb(b,λ) = 0 and λ̇= 0 for all λ. That is, the locus of λ̇= 0 is
11This locus does not exist insofar as non-negative lump-sum transfers are allowed, for this restricts λ ≥ 0. Otherwise, the
λ̇= 0 locus exists in the negative territory of the L region.
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now the entirety of region H.
The last property may look peculiar but it actually epitomizes the optimality of tax smoothing in the
textbook paradigm (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983). In that model, both the liquidity-provision
and the interest-rate concerns are absent, so λ̇ =Ωb = 0 over the entire phase diagram. Here, the same
applies to the portion of the phase diagram above satiation.
This also explains why, in region H, there exist a continuum of apparently optimal steady states,
corresponding to the segment of the “balanced budget” line inside that region. That is, for any b0 > bbliss,
the policy plan that keeps debt and taxes constant for ever satisfies not only the budget constraint and
the Euler condition, but also the transversality condition. However, for b0 ∈ (bskiba,bbliss), this plan is
actually dominated by an alternative plan, illustrated in Figure 1 by the segment of the saddle path that
starts inside region H and enters into region M.
Along this plan, debt falls gradually, crossing bbli ss within finite time and converging asymptotically
to b∗. Compared to the Barro-like plan of staying at b = b0 for ever, this plan necessitates a departure
from tax smoothing (higher taxes early, lower taxes later), which is costly. But it allows the government
to extract a profit in terms of interest-rate suppression, once debt has fallen below bbliss. Provided that
this happens fast enough, which is the case if b0 ∈ (bbliss,bskiba), the sacrifice in terms of tax smoothing is
justified. The converse is true if b0 > bskiba.
4 Discussion
In this section we comment on the nature of optimal-long run quantity of public debt, the role played
by the desire to smooth taxes, the robustness of our insights to the possibility that public debt crows out
(or, in) capital, and the importance of the assumption that debt is non-neutral.
4.1 The optimal long-run quantity of public debt
By the fact that (b∗,λ∗) is a steady state below satiation, Ωb(b∗,λ∗) = 0. By the Auxiliary Assumptions,
Ω(b,λ) is concave in b over [0,bbliss] for any λ≥ 0. The following is then immediate:
Proposition 3. Consider the steady state to which the economy converges whenever it starts with b0 <
bskiba. In this steady state, the level of debt satisfies




where λ∗ =U ′(s∗) and s∗+π(b∗)b∗ = g +ρb∗.
This verifies that the discussion in Section 2.4 provides the right intuition about the optimal steady-
state level of debt, subject to two caveats: that we take into account the fixed-point relation between the
debt level b∗ and the weight λ∗ that appears inside Ω; and that this steady state is applicable only for
some initial conditions, not all.
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We have thus established the existence of a well-defined, stable, long-run target debt level, b∗, that
falls short of the level that satiates the economy. And also that this level balances the value of easing
the financial friction with the need to suppress interest rates. The former property contrasts with the
textbook policy paradigm (Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Barro, 1979), where tax smoothing dictates that the
long-run level of debt moves one-to-one with its initial level. The same property also allows us to study
the optimal policy response to shocks (the topic of Section 5 below) using the transitional dynamics in
the neighborhood of this steady state.
The second property underscores the value of preserving the financial friction so as to keep gov-
ernment borrowing cheap. This value is missing from the analyses of Woodford (1990) and Holmström
and Tirole (1998), because they do not consider distortionary taxation. And although it is present in the
environment of Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), it is not properly accounted for, because their solution
strategy—maximizing steady-state welfare subject to the steady-state budget—incorrectly treats the en-
tire interest rate payments on public debt as a fiscal cost. By contrast, the correct planning problem
ought to recognize that the component ρb of these interest rate payments is not a cost and, instead, debt
issuance is a profit-generating business to the tune of π(b)b.12
4.2 Tax smoothing and the tripartite trade off
When b0 > bbl i ss , the economy starts from a position of collateral abundance and has no role for public
debt. While we find this possibility of little practical interest, allowing for it in the model helps illustrate
two broader points. First, that the planner may intentionally manufacture a shortage of collateral, for
the sake of suppressing the interest rate on public debt. And second, that the desire to smooth taxes not
only shapes the rate of convergence to the applicable long-run target for public debt but may also justify
convergence to different long-run positions from different starting positions.13
Together, these points underscore how the optimal policy balances three objectives at once: the value
of easing the financial friction; the need to contain interest-rate costs; and the desire to smooth taxes. It
is this tripartite trade off that ultimately shapes all the properties of the optimal policy—including the
steady state(s), the transitional dynamics, and the response to shocks.
4.3 Crowding out (or in) capital
Consider the following extension of our baseline model. In each afternoon, households have access to
a technology of transforming the current consumption good into capital, which in turn can be used not
12See Appendix C.4 for a precise explanation of what the Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) solution strategy is, of why it may
misses to detect the existence of multiple steady states, and of why it mis-characterizes the steady state even when it is unique.
13This same logic also explains why, without the Auxiliary Assumptions introduced above, it is possible ot have multiple
steady states below satiation. Intuitively, the “adjustment cost” of a long-lasting departure from tax smoothing can justify
remaining at one steady state when another, seemingly superior, steady state exists but is sufficiently far away (in terms of
initial conditions). See Appendix B for a detailed treatment.
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only for the production of the consumption good next afternoon but also as collateral next morning. This
brings exactly two changes in the model. First, it changes the borrowing constraints (4)-(5) replacing ai t
with ai t +ki t , where ki t denotes the amount of capital held in the beginning of period t . And second, it
modifies the budget constraint (3) as follows:
ci t +pt xi t +qt ai t+1 +ki t+1 = ai t + f (ki t )+ (1−τt )wt hi t +pt ē.
where f is a production function with f ′ > 0 > f ′′, f (0) = 0, and f ′(0) ≥ 1/β.
Because capital and the risk-free bond are equally good forms of collateral, the following arbitrage
condition has to hold for all i and t :





It follows that all households choose the same amount of capital, and this amount is positively related
to πt . Intuitively, when the financial friction is more binding, there is an incentive to hold both more
capital and bonds. By the same token, when the government issues more debt, it lowers πt and crowds
out capital, similarly to Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998). This however does not change the essence of the
policy problem.
Proposition 4. In the extension described above, public debt crowds out capital. Still, the reduced-form
representation of the policy problem given in Proposition 1 continues to hold.
The precise micro-foundations of V and π are now different, but neither their qualitative properties
nor the implications for policy are affected. The fact that the issuance of public debt may crowd out
capital is not an additional, separate element of the costs and benefits of debt issuance. It is merely a
symptom of the role of public debt in easing the underlying financial friction.
Furthermore, this symptom can be turned upside down by letting the financial friction impact the
production side of the economy, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Holmström and Tirole (1998). We
offer an example of such a model in Appendix A. There, public debt can crowd in capital accumulation
by easing the friction among firms, improving the cross-sectional allocation of capital and labor, and
raising aggregate TFP. Furthermore, this crowding-in can be strong enough to offset the crowding-out
of the higher taxes associated with higher levels of debt. Still, the basic trade-off we have emphasized—
between the benefits of easing the friction and the desire to suppress interest rates—remains present.
These points underscore the likely robustness of our policy lessons to different micro-foundations
of the role of public debt as buffer stock or collateral. A similar point applies to the substitutability of
private assets and government bonds in this function. Our baseline model allowed for perfect substi-
tutability. Assuming imperfect substitutability changes the magnitudes of V and π, but does not change
the essence of the problem and does not upset the results.
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4.4 On Ricardian Equivalence
What is essential for our results is the non-neutrality of public debt. To see this more clearly, modify our
baseline model so that the private sector’s pledgeable income moves one-to-one with future tax obli-
gations. This preserves the financial friction but renders public debt neutral: any increase in aggregate
collateral in the form of additional public debt issuance is perfectly offset by a commensurate reduction
in pledgeable income. The same point applies to Woodford (1990), Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), and
Holmström and Tirole (1998): if borrowing constraints adjusted to future tax obligations, public debt
would be neutral in those papers as well.
This, however, does not mean that the economy reduces to that in Barro (1979). Although π is now
invariant to b, it is still positive (insofar as the financial friction binds). That is, the interest rate is still
depressed, although insensitive to the level of public debt. Accordingly, the Euler condition gives λ̇ =
πλ> 0, where π> 0 is fixed, and the following result obtains.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the friction is present but public debt is neutral. Then, optimal taxes and
debt exhibit a positive drift. In the long run, debt converges to b̄, the highest sustainable level.
This result is a “sanity test,” which further clarifies how our main lessons depend on the causal effect
of public debt on liquidity premia and interest rates—a causal effect that is corroborated by the evidence
in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Greenwood and Vayanos (2014).
5 Optimal Response to Shocks
We now study how the tripartite trade off between liquidity provision, interest-rate suppression and tax
smoothing shapes the optimal response to shocks. Thanks to the (local) determinacy and stability of
the steady state, this can be understood by studying the comparative dynamics in the phase diagram
introduced in Section 3. For further illustration, we also use the numerical, non-linear solution of a
stochastic extension of the original, discrete-time model from Section 2.14
5.1 Wars
Consider the comparative dynamics associated with an unexpected, once and for all, increase in g . They
are illustrated in Figure 2. Prior to the change, the economy is assumed to be resting at the steady-state
point b∗ol d . The increase in g causes the ḃ = 0 locus to shift upwards, reflecting the increase in the taxes
required for balanced budget. By contrast, the λ̇= 0 locus does not move, because g does not enter the
planner’s Euler condition.
14Throughout this section, we let public debt be risk-free, as in Barro (1979) and Aiyagari et al. (2002). The opposite scenario,
which allows public debt to be fully state-contingent, is considered in Appendix C.2. As in Lucas and Stokey (1983), this scenario
allows the government to insure its budget against shocks; but now the optimal state-contingency balances such insurance with
the objectives of providing liquidity and suppressing interest rates.
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As a result, the steady-state level of debt drops from b∗ol d to b
∗
new and the optimal dynamic response is
as follows: on impact, λ and the associated tax rate jump up from their old steady-state values to values
that set the economy on a new saddle path; thereafter, debt and tax monotonically decrease towards
the new steady state. Initially, taxes increase by more than the increase in g in order to allow debt to
decrease.. But as both the level of debt and the interest rate on it fall, the government can eventually
afford a lower increase in taxes than the increase in g .
Proposition 6. An unanticipated permanent increase in g calls for an increase in taxes by more than one-
to-one in the short run and by less than one-to-one in the long run.
Compare this result to Barro (1979) or Aiyagari et al. (2002). There, the optimal response to a fiscal
shock gives prominence to tax smoothing. Here, the optimal response deviates from tax smoothing in
order to squeeze liquidity and allow the government to enjoy a profit by means of lower interest rates.
The same logic applies to transitory fiscal shocks, what is often referred to in the literature as “wars”.
We illustrate this in Figure 3, using a stochastic example in which government spending follows a sym-
metric two-state Markov process, with the probability of staying in the same state equal to 0.9. The black
lines correspond to our baseline model, the orange lines to its Barro/AMSS counterpart.
In Barro/AMSS, the war leaves a permanent mark on the level of debt and the rate of taxation, re-
flecting the unit-root property of that benchmark. Furthermore, the size of the tax response is simply the
change in the annuity value of government spending. In our setting, by contrast, the debt level eventu-
ally reverts to its initial position, reflecting the determinacy of the long-run target level of debt. Finally,
the accumulation of debt during the war is less pronounced than that in Barro/AMSS, because doing so
permits the planner to moderate the increase in interest rates, which would have further tightened the
budget.15 By the same token, the planner raises larger taxes during the war, but also enjoys lower taxes
in the aftermath of the war.
15If the war is sufficiently persistent, this mechanism becomes so strong that the level of debt actually falls, as in the example
with the permanent change discussed earlier.
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Figure 3: Optimal Response to a War
Debt and Taxes in our Model; Debt and Taxes in Barro/AMSS; Government Spending.
5.2 Flight to Quality
Consider a shock that tightens the financial friction and raises the demand for public debt, without how-
ever affecting aggregate output, tax revenue, and the wedge between the private and social value of liq-
uidity. Formally, let V (b) = θṼ (b) and π(b) = θπ̃(b), for some fixed functions Ṽ and π̃, and consider an
increase in θ. We think of this situation as a “flight to quality.”
Because this raises the social value of liquidity and the profit from interest-rate suppression in pro-
portion to each other, it leaves the λ̇= 0 locus unaffected. It follows that, if the ḃ = 0 locus had also been
unaffected, the optimal policy response would have been to stay put. But ḃ = 0 actually shifts down,
because the shock reduces the interest-rate costs on public debt, thus also reducing the taxes needed for
balanced budget.
In a nutshell, a positive θ shock acts similarly to a negative g shock: the private sector’s flight to
quality brings a bonanza for the government.
Proposition 7. A unexpected permanent increase in θ causes an increase in the long-run level of public
debt, and a front-loaded reduction in taxes.
Of course, reality is more complicated than the scenario just described. A financial shock is likely to
have additional, and possibly countervailing, effects on the government budget, such as shrinking the
tax basis or necessitating a fiscal stimulus. Still, our insights provide a rationale for why financial shocks
may justify larger deficits than other shocks. We further expand on this below.
Finally, our analysis qualifies the familiar intuition that an increase in the demand for liquidity calls
for an increase in the government’s provision of it. The conventional intuition, though, fails to take into
account how such a shock may also raise the marginal return to interest-rate suppression. This explains
why, in our context, the optimal supply of liquidity would have not increased had it not been for the
aforementioned “bonanza” effect and the resulting drop in λ.16
16Only a pure externality shock, which raises V without affecting π, is fully consistent with the aforementioned intuition.
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5.3 Traditional vs Financial Recessions
Let us capture a “recession” as an exogenous shock to the labor wedge. This naturally leads to lower
aggregate output and tax revenue, and an increase in the deficit.17 Next, let us distinguish between “tra-
ditional” and “financial” recessions as follows: the former leaves the functions π and V unaffected, the
latter raises them by tightening the underlying financial constraints.
Figure 4 illustrates the optimal policy response to two such recessions of comparable size, in the
sense that the exogenous shock to the labor wedge is the same in both cases. , The difference is whether
the shock comes together with an increase in π (black lines) or not (orange lines). The figure indicates
that it is optimal to run a larger deficit in the former case. And yet, the higher deficits do not translate
into faster debt accumulation. This is because the government is able to roll over its original debt at lower
interest rates, as well as to pay less interest on newly issued debt. For the same reason, the government
is also able to afford a larger optimal stimulus in the form of a larger “payroll tax cut.”18
Figure 4: IRFs to a Financial vs Traditional Recession











































Traditional recession, with π unchanged; Financial recession, with large enough increase in π.
This provides a formal basis for the argument made by Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong and others that
the reduction in the government’s cost of borrowing during a financial crisis calls for (makes it optimal)
to run larger deficits. But it is important to emphasize the part of the statement that says “during a
financial crisis”: what is key is not the variation in the observed interest rate per se, but rather the extent
to which this represents variation in the wedge between that rate and the counterfactual rate that would
have obtained in the absence of a financial friction. Were ρ to drop along side the interest rate, leaving
the wedge, π, the same or smaller, public debt would not be cheaper.
Such a shock shifts the λ̇= 0 curve to the right without shifting the ḃ = 0 curve. It therefore raises b∗, but for a different reason
than that associated with a θ shock: the aforementioned “bonanza” effect is gone.
17Formally, we modify the model of Section 2 by letting the equilibrium condition for labor be v ′(nt ) = (1−τt )(1+ωt ), where
ωt is an exogenous shock. We then capture a recession as a transitory negative shock to ωt . As usual, this proxies a negative
demand shock in the New Keynesian model. A supply (productivity) shock has similar effects on output and tax revenue, but
negates the need for a fiscal stimulus.
18Clearly, the same is true for government spending if we endogenize g and let the recession raise its marginal value.
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6 Conclusion
We have studied optimal policy in a setting where public debt management helps not only smooth taxes
(as in Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983) but also regulate the amount of collateral or liquidity (as in
Woodford, 1990; Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998; Holmström and Tirole, 1998). Issuing more public debt
raises welfare by easing the underlying financial friction. But it also tightens the government budget by
raising interest rates relative to the social discount rate.
This trade off creates the possibility that the government could optimally restrict the amount of liq-
uidity in the market in order to keep the cost of debt finance low. It necessitates a departure from tax
smoothing in the short run, so as to help attain an appropriate long-run level of debt. And it modifies the
optimal response to shocks. In particular, it becomes optimal to run smaller deficits during wars, so as to
contain the increase in interest rates; and larger deficits during financial crises, because such episodes
are associated with cheap borrowing opportunities.
An obvious direction for future research is the quantification of the effects documented in this paper.
The success of any such attempt would depend crucially on how sensitive the spread between the mar-
ket price of public debt and the appropriate social discount factor is both to the state of the economy
and to the quantity of public debt. The evidence in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and
Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) is suggestive of high sensitivity in both dimensions. That work, however,
has focused on a different spread, that between government and high-grade corporate bonds, which is
likely to be only imperfectly correlated with the spread that, at least under the prism of our analysis, is
most relevant for optimal fiscal policy. We hope that these observations will guide future empirical and
quantitative work on the topic.
Another interesting direction for future research is the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in
a sticky-price extension of our setting. We have in mind the following two issues in particular. During
normal times, monetary policy could help create fiscal space by manipulating the real interest rate on
public debt. And during a liquidity trap, public debt issuance could ease the zero lower bound constraint
on monetary policy by providing liquidity and raising the underlying natural rate of interest. We hope
that the tractability of the framework introduced in this paper will facilitate the exploration of these and
other questions.
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A Variant Micro-foundations with Capital
In this appendix we present a variant model in which the financial friction impedes the allocation of
capital across entrepreneurs, as opposed to the allocation of a good across consumers. This variant
offers, not only an illustration of the broader applicability of the policy insights we developed in the
main text, but also a bridge to the literature that emphasizes the role of collateral in the production side
of the economy, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Holmström and Tirole (1998).
There is only one good, which can be either consumed or converted into capital. There are no taste
shocks and per-period utility is given by ci t −ν(hi t ), where ci t denotes consumption and hi t denotes
labor supply. Each household comprises a “worker”, who supplies hi t in a competitive labor market, and
an “entrepreneur”, who runs a private firm. The latter’s output is given by yi t = θi t f (ki t ,ni t ), where ki t is
the firm’s capital input, ni t is the firm’s employment, and θi t is an idiosyncratic productivity shock. f (·, ·)
is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Let κi t denote the amount of capital owned by household i in the morning of period t . It is given by
κi t = (1−δ)κi t−1 + ιi t−1, where δ denotes depreciation and ιi t−1 denotes last period’s saving. The firm’s
input ki t can differ from κi t insofar as entrepreneurs can rent capital from one another. Such trades are
beneficial because κi t is fixed prior to the realization of the current shocks, whereas ki t and ni t adjust ex
post. In short, there are gains from reallocating capital.
Importantly, this reallocation is impeded by a financial friction. Let pt denote the rental rate of capi-
tal. To use ki t > κi t , the entrepreneur must borrow zi t = pt (ki t −κi t ) in a short-term IOU market. As in
the baseline model, he can do so by pledging φ and/or by posting his financial assets, ai t , as collateral.
Moreover, he can use a fraction of the invested capital and/or the firm’s output as additional collateral.
That is, the relevant constraint is
zi t ≤φ+ai t +ξk ki t +ξy yi t
where ξk ,ξy ∈ (0,1) are the fractions of invested capital and of anticipated income that can serve as collat-
eral. Finally, the agent can also borrow in the afternoon, if he wishes so, but only subject to the constraint
ai t+1 ≤φ+κi t+1; that is, his net worth cannot fall below φ.
Relative to the baseline model, the model described above allows the quantity of public debt to enter
the economy’s aggregate production function. In particular, by improving the allocation of capital, more
aggregate collateral in the form of more public debt can map to higher aggregate TFP. Furthermore, pub-
lic debt can have an ambiguous effect on capital accumulation. On the one hand, more public debt can
crowd in capital via the aforementioned channel, namely by raising aggregate TFP and thereby the mean
return to investment. On the other hand, more public debt can crowd out capital by offering a substitute
form of collateral or buffer stock, as in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998).
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Notwithstanding these differences, the nature of the policy problem remains essentially the same. In
particular, it can be shown that the following variant of Proposition 2 holds.






βt W (τt ,bt ) (22)
s.t . Q(τt+1,bt+1)bt+1 = bt + g −S(τt ,bt ) (23)
Proof. See Appendix D.
To relate this proposition to Proposition 2, note that W , Q, and S capture, respectively, the per-period
welfare flow, the market price of public debt and the tax revenue.19 As we move from the baseline model
to the new model, the micro-foundations that underlie these objects change, and so do their functional
forms. For instance, the two distortions now have non-separable effects on welfare, interest rates, and
the tax base. Yet, the strategy for obtaining the desired representation remains the same: the key step is
to define W as the welfare flow that obtains when the planner takes as given (τt ,bt ) and optimizes over
the set of the cross-sectional allocations of labor, capital, and asset holdings and the aggregate supplies
of capital and labor; Q and S are then defined by, respectively, the interest rate that supports the best
implementable allocation and the primary surplus induced by it. Importantly, the only reason why W ,
Q and S depend on b is that the latter controls the financial friction. The representation obtained there-
fore encapsulates, once again, the dual role of the financial distortion on welfare and the government
budget. What is new relative to the baseline model is that the financial friction affects the budget, not
only via interest rates, but also via the tax base: by interfering with the allocation of capital, it affects
wages, income, and tax revenue for any given tax rate. However, neither this feature nor the details of the
underlying micro-foundations need alter the properties of optimal policy.
In particular, consider the following continuous-time policy problem which is motivated by the pre-




e−ρt W (τ,b)dt (24)
s.t . ḃ = [ρ−π(τ,b)]b + g −S(τ,b) ∀t (25)
b(0) = b0 (26)
Suppose that the functions W,S,π are continuously differentiable in both τ and b. Suppose further that
there exists a function bbl i ss such that ρ > π(τ,b) > 0 and Wb(b,τ) > 0 if b < bbl i ss(τ), whereas π(τ,b) =
19In the baseline model, we could express the policy problem in terms of s rather than τ because there was a one-to-one
mapping between them. In the current model, this is no more true and, accordingly, we keep the tax rate as a control variable.
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Wb(b,τ) = 0 if b ≥ bbl i ss(τ); this allows for the possibility that the “satiation point” beyond which the fric-
tion ceases to bind may depend on the tax rate. Similarly, let bsei g n(τ) ≡ argmax{π(τ,b)b +S(τ,b)} ; this
is the analogue to the level of debt that maximized seigniorage in our baseline model, except that now
we accommodate the possibility that the quantity of aggregate collateral affects the government budget,
not only via the interest rate on public debt, but also via aggregate output and tax revenue. Adjusting the
notion of “liquidity plus seigniorage” accordingly gives
Ω(b,λ) ≡ max
τ
{W (τ,b)+λ[π(τ,b)b +S(τ,b)]} .
We can express the planner’s Euler condition as
λ̇= Γ(b,λ) ≡Ωb(b,λ),
which has exactly the same interpretation as its counterpart in our baseline model. Similarly, we can
express the budget constraint as
ḃ =Ψ(b,λ),
where Ψ(b,λ) ≡ [ρ − π(T (λ),b)]b − S(T (λ),b) and T (λ) = argmaxτ {W (τ,b)+λ[π(τ,b)b +S(τ,b)]} . We
therefore obtain essentially the same ODE system as in our baseline model; the underlying micro-foundations
and some details are different but the essence remains the same.




bsei g n bbli ss bbski ba
λski ba
ḃ = 0λ̇= 0
b∗
λ∗
We illustrate this in Figure 5. For this example, we assume that [π(τ,b)b +S(τ,b)], is single-peaked
in b. This guarantees that the phase diagram can be split in three regions, similar to regions L, M and
H in Figure 1. The boundaries of these regions are now curved, rather than vertical, reflecting the fact
that bsei g n and bbl i ss are allowed to vary with the rate of taxation and thereby with λ. Other than this
difference, however, the analysis of the phase diagram remains intact: there is a unique steady state in
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which the financial friction does not bind, and the economy converges to it for all initial b0 < bski ba , for
some bski ba .
Although we will not provide a complete characterization of the more general class of policy prob-
lems using this model, we hope to have conveyed the message that our insights are robust to different
micro-foundations of the financial friction and of the liquidity-enhancing role of public debt.
We close this appendix by illustrating how the present model allows for public debt to crowd in cap-
ital, in contrast to Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998). This is done in Figure 6, for a particular parameteriza-
tion of the model.
Figure 6: Crowding in or out
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The left panel of Figure 6 considers the policy rule for aggregate capital. In particular, we consider
two economies: one with a relatively low level of government spending (g =17% of steady-state output);
and another with a relatively high level of government spending (g =27% of steady-state output) cor-
responding higher taxes in steady state. For each of these economies, we then show how the optimal
amount of capital varies with the level of public debt, holding constant the tax rate at the respective
steady-state level.20 As can be seen from this panel, public debt crowds in capital. This is unlike Aiyagari
and McGrattan (1998), because here public debt helps improve production efficiency and thereby raise
the return to capital, which in turn encourages capital accumulation.
The right panel of Figure 6 shifts attention to the aggregate capital dynamics along the transition to
steady state, starting from an initial level of debt below steady state. Along this transition, the increase
in public debt crowds in capital by easing the underlying financial friction. But taxes increase in tandem
with public debt, and this contributes in the opposite direction, by discouraging labor supply. It follows
that capital could either increase or decrease along the transition to the steady state. But it is interesting
to note that, as illustrated by the low-g scenario in the figure, it is possible that the crowding-in effect of
public debt can dominate the crowding-out effect of taxes.
20Both public debt and private capital are normalized by the steady-state level of output in the respective economy
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B Characterization of Optimal Plan
In this Appendix we offer a complete, self-contained, characterization of the solution to problem (18)-
(19). In particular:
• We show how to adapt the methods of Skiba (1978) to our setting so as to identify the truly optimal
path among the many that satisfy the Euler and transversality conditions
• We fill in the details of the benchmark case considered in the main text.We show how Assumption
B guarantees the existence of a unique steady state below satiation and prove Theorem 1.
• We show how, away from the aforementioned benchmark, it is possible to have multiple steady
states below satiation, as well as no such steady state.
• We finally explain the precise sense in which the lessons obtained in the main text remain robust
to the richer cases allowed here.
Also note that some of the results from this appendix are used in the proofs found in Appendix D.
B.1 The ODE system
As shown in the main text, the Hamiltonian of the planner’s problem can be written as follows:
H(s,b,λ) =U (s)+λ[s −ρb − g ]+Ω(b,λ),
where Ω(b,λ) ≡ V (b)+λπ(b)b measures the social value of the liquidity services of public debt plus the
profit made from providing these services, and λmeasures the shadow value of tax revenue. Throughout
this Appendix, we are ruling out both lump-sum taxes and lump-sum transfers. This allows the possi-
bility that λ < 0, or equivalently s < 0 and τ < 0, which means the planner may be using a distortionary
subsidy in order to accumulate debt fast enough.21
We now study the ODE system for b and λ implied by the budget constraint and the planner’s Euler
condition.
Consider first the budget constraint. This can be expressed as follows:
ḃ =Ψ(b,λ) ≡ g + (ρ−π(b))b − s(λ), (27)
where s(λ) denotes the optimal tax revenue. It is straightforward to check that s(λ) is increasing in λ as
the economy lies on the increasing branch of the Laffer curve and therefore that Ψ(b,λ) is decreasing
21Had we allowed the planner to use lump-sum transfers, this possibility would not have emerged: the optimal policy would
have achieved the same goal with a non-distortionary lump-sum transfer. This curtails the negative territory of the phase
diagram (i.e., it restricts λ≥ 0) but does not otherwise affect the optimal dynamics.
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in λ: a higher λ means higher taxes today, which in turn means lower debt tomorrow.22 By the Implicit
Function Theorem, there exists a function ψ : [b, b̄) →R+ such thatΨ(b,ψ(b)) = 0 for all b; equivalently,
ḃ = 0 if and only if λ=ψ(b).
The mapping ψ(b) identifies the value of λ, or equivalently the tax rate, that balances the budget when
the level of debt is b. Note that ḃ < 0 when λ > ψ(b), that is, debt falls if taxes exceed the aforemen-
tioned level, and symmetrically ḃ > 0 if λ<ψ(b). Finally, note that the function ψ satisfies the following
properties.
Lemma 1. ψ is continuous and strictly increasing, with ψ(b) = 0 and limb→b̄ψ(b) =+∞.
Proof. ψ(b) is strictly increasing in b because higher debt requires higher taxes to balance the budget;
ψ(b) starts at zero when b = b because taxes are zero when the government has a large enough asset
position to fully finance its spending using interest income received on its assets; and ψ(b) diverges to
+∞ as b approaches b̄ because the shadow cost of taxation explodes as debt approaches the maximal
sustainable level and, equivalently, the tax rate approaches the peak of the Laffer curve.
Consider next the Euler condition. As explained in the main text, this can be written as
λ̇=Ωb(b,λ),
whereΩ(b,λ) ≡V (b)+λπ(b)b. Equivalently,
λ̇ = v(b)−λπ(b) (σ(b)−1) . (28)






is the elasticity of the liquidity premium with respect to the quantity of public debt.
As a reference point, consider momentarily the case in which public debt has no liquidity value, so
that v(b) = π(b) = 0 for all b. Condition (28) then reduces to λ̇ = 0, which represents Barro’s celebrated
tax-smoothing result: when debt is priced at the social discount rate, λ is constant over time, and hence
the optimal tax is also constant. Relative to this reference point, we see that whenever the right-hand-
side of (28) is non-zero, optimality requires a non-zero drift in λ, that is, a deviation from tax smoothing.
Let ∆≡ {b ∈ [b,bbli ss) :σ(b) 6= 1} and define the function γ :∆→R as follows:
γ(b) ≡ v(b)
π(b)(σ(b)−1) .
22Note also thatΨ(b,λ) has a kink at λ= 0, because the corner solution τ= 0 binds as λ crosses zero from below. Relaxing the
lower bound on τ and/or introducing lump sum transfers would help speed up the accumulation of debt in situations in which
λ< 0, but would not otherwise affect the results.
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0 if b ∉∆
(29)
By implication,
λ̇= 0 if and only if
 either b ∈∆ and λ= γ(b)or b ∉∆ and λ ∈R
It follows that the graph of γ identifies the λ̇ = 0 locus over the region to the left of the satiation point
(that is, for b < bbl i ss). To the right of this point, we instead have λ̇= 0 regardless of (λ,b).
The graph of γ can be quite complicated, in part because there may exist multiple “holes” in the
domain ∆, that is, multiple points at which σ(b) = 1. To interpret these points, note that
d [π(b)b]
db
=π′(b)b +π(b) =−(σ(b)−1)π(b). (30)
It follows that the points at which σ(b) = 1 correspond to the critical points of the function π(b)b, which,
as explained before, represents the rent, or the profit, that the government can make by falling short
of satiating the economy’s demand for liquidity. With abuse of language, we henceforth refer to this
rent as “seigniorage”. Next, note that π(b)b is continuous over the closed interval [0,bbli ss], it is zero
at the boundaries of the interval, and is strictly positive in the interior of the interval. It follows that
seigniorage attains a global maximum in the interior of that interval. In general, π(b)b may admit an
arbitrary number of local maxima and minima in addition to its global maximum. By the same token, σ
may cross 1 multiple times. Note, however, that the derivative of π(b)b crosses zero from above at any
point that attains the global maximum, which in turn means thatσ(b) is necessarily increasing in an area
around such a point.
B.2 The case studied in the main text
We now focus on a slightly more general case than the one studied in the main text—more specifically
we dispense with Auxiliary Assumption B3 and only maintain the following two assumptions
B1. the ratio v/π is constant;
B2. the elasticity σ is increasing in b ∈ (0,bbl i ss).
The first assumption imposes that the wedge between the social and the private value of collateral is
invariant to b, the second guarantees that π(b)b is single-peaked and also extends the aforementioned
local monotonicity of σ to its entire domain. In the sequel, we will refer to the peak in π(b)b as bsei g n .
This peak satisfies π(bsei g n)+π′(bsei g n)bsei g n =π(bsei g n)(1−σ(bsei g n)) = 0. An implication of B2 is then
that σ(b) < 1 for b < bsei g n and σ(b) > 1 for b > bsei g n . Dispensing from B3 will allow use to obtain a
more general characterization of the cases implied by B1 and B2.
Together, these assumptions lead to following characterization of the optimal debt dynamics.
29
Proposition 9. Let Assumptions B1 and B2 hold. There exists a unique b∗ ∈ (b,bbl i ss] such that, for any
initial point b0 < bbl i ss , the optimal level of public debt converges monotonically to b∗. Furthermore,
b∗ < bbli ss if g > ĝ and b∗ = bbl i ss if g < ĝ , for some ĝ .
This result identifies b∗ as the steady state to which the economy converges from any initial point
b0 < bbl i ss . It also relates b∗ to the satiation point bbli ss . In particular, it shows that b∗ is strictly lower
than bbli ss if and only if g is high enough. Theorem 1 in the main text then follows directly from noting
that Property B3 in the main text is the same as g > ĝ here. The rest of the section is dedicated to proving
Proposition 9 in multiple steps, developing additional insights on the way. We start by noting that Prop-
erty B1 and B2 imply the following structure for the function γ, which is instrumental for the subsequent
analysis.
Lemma 2. Let Assumptions B1 and B2 hold. The domain of γ is ∆ = [b,bsei g n)∪ (bsei g n ,bbl i ss), where
bsei g n ≡ argmaxπ(b)b. For b ∈ [b,bsei g n), γ is negatively valued and decreasing. For b ∈ (bsei g n ,bbl i ss),
γ is positively valued and decreasing. Finally, γ(b) → −∞ as b → bsei g n from below and γ(b) → +∞ as
b → bsei g n from above.
Proof. Recall that bsei g n = argmaxb π(b)b, so that bsei g n solves π(b)(1−σ(b)) = 0. Note that, as afore-
mentioned, for bsei g n to be a maximum, the following has to hold: π(b)(1−σ(b)) ≷ 0 for b ≶ bsei g n .
From the definition of γ and the assumption V ′(b) ∝π(b), we have
γ(b) ∝ 1
π(b)(σ(b)−1) ≶ 0 for b≶ bsei g n
The latter result together with the definition of bsei g n implies that limb↑bsei g n γ(b) =−∞ and limb↓bsei g n γ(b) =
∞. Finally, as b increases above bsei g n , π(b)(1−σ(b)) < 0 and γ(b) <∞. Together with the monotonicity
of σ(b), this implies that γ(b) is decreasing over the domain [b,bbl i ss).
Recall that the graph of γ identifies the λ̇ = 0 locus in the region to the left of the satiation point,
whereas the ḃ = 0 locus is given by the graph of ψ. By Lemma 1, ψ is positively valued and strictly
increasing. Together with Lemma 2, this means that γ and ψ can intersect at most once. In particular,
letting γbl i ss ≡ limb↑bbl i ss γ(b) and ψbl i ss ≡ψ(bbl i ss),23 we have the following property.
Lemma 3. Let Assumptions B1 and B2 hold. If γbli ss > ψbl i ss , then γ and ψ never intersect. If instead
γbl i ss < ψbli ss , then γ and ψ intersect exactly once, and this intersection occurs at b = b∗, for some b∗ ∈
(bsei g n ,bbli ss).
23Recall that γ is defined to the left of the satiation point but not at it, which explains why we write γbl i ss ≡ limb↑bbl i ss γ(b)
rather than γbli ss ≡ γ(bbl i ss ). Also, the existence of the limit follows from the property that, in the neighborhood of bbl i ss , γ
is decreasing and bounded from below by 0. Finally, note that this last property is true in general, not just in the special case
under consideration.
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Proof. From Lemma 2, we know that ψ(b) and γ(b) can only intersect in (bsei g n ,bbl i ss). Given (i) the
monotonicity of σ(b) and hence γ(b), (ii) the fact that ψ(b) is increasing and (iii) limb↓bsei g n γ(b) = ∞,
γ(b) and ψ(b) can intersect at most once. If γbl i ss > ψbl i ss , (i) and (iii) imply that γ(b) lies above ψ(b)
everywhere in (bsei g n ,bbli ss] and therefore they never intersect. In γbl i ss <ψbl i ss , (i)–(iii) imply that they
intersect only once.
The two scenarios are illustrated in, respectively, Figures 7 and 8. The latter is the same as Figure 1 in
the main text, reproduced here to ease the exposition.
Let us first consider Figure 7. The phase diagram is split in three regions: the region L, for b < bsei g n ;
the region M, for b ∈ (bsei g n ,bbl i ss); and the region H, for b > bbl i ss . The dynamics of b are qualitatively
similar across all three regions: ḃ > 0 below the graph of ψ and ḃ < 0 above it. By contrast, the dynamics
of λ differ qualitatively across the three regions. In region L, γ is negatively valued; λ̇> 0 above the graph
of γ; and λ̇ < 0 below it. In region M, the reverse is true: γ is positively valued; λ̇ < 0 above the graph of
γ; and λ̇ > 0 below it. Finally, in region H, γ is undefined and λ̇ = 0 throughout. These properties also
hold true in Figure 8. What distinguishes the two figures is whether γ andψ admit an intersection within
region M. In Figure 7, they do not. This is because we have imposed γbli ss >ψbl i ss , which together with
the monotonicity of γ and ψ guarantees that γ lies above ψ throughout region M.
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What do these properties imply for the solution to the planner’s problem? Since γ and ψ never inter-
sect for the case depicted in Figure 7, the ODE system (27)-(29) admits no steady state to the left of the
satiation point bbli ss (regions L and M). By contrast, there is a continuum of such steady-state points to
the right of the satiation point (region H): any point along the segment of ψ that lies to the right of bbl i ss
trivially satisfies both λ̇ = 0 and ḃ = 0. Whether the planner finds it optimal to rest at such a point or
move away from it—i.e., whether these points correspond to a steady state of the optimal dynamics as
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opposed to merely a fixed point of the ODE system—remains to be seen. For now, let us note that the
lowest of these fixed points is associated with b = bbl i ss and λ=ψbl i ss ≡ψ(bbl i ss); the latter corresponds
to the level of taxes that balances the budget when the economy rests at the satiation point.
For any b0 < bbli ss , there exists a unique value of the costate, λ0 < ψ(b0), such as the following is
true: if the economy starts from (b0,λ0) and thereafter follows the dynamics dictated by (27)-(29), then,
and only then, the economy converges asymptotically to (bbl i ss ,λbl i ss). In other words, there is a unique
path that satisfies the planner’s Euler condition and the budget constraint at all dates, and that eventually
leads to satiation. This path is indicated with blue color in the figure.24
The aforementioned path trivially satisfies the transversality condition, and is therefore a candidate
for optimality. By contrast, any path that starts with λ(0) > λ0 (higher taxes) and that follows the ODEs
causes the level of debt to reach the lower bound b in finite time; at this point, λ would have to jump
down, violating the Euler condition, which means that this path cannot be optimal. Similarly, any path
that starts with λ(0) < λ0 (lower taxes) causes the level of debt to increase past the satiation point bbl i ss
and to reach the upper limit b̄ in finite time; at this point, λ would diverge to infinity and the transver-
sality condition would be violated, which means that neither this path can be optimal.
Consequently, for any b0 < bbli ss , the path that leads to satiation is the optimal path, and Proposition
9 applies with b∗ = bbl i ss . For any b0 ≥ bbli ss , the only candidate for optimality is the steady-state point
associated with smoothing taxes and “staying put” at the initial level of debt: (b,λ) = (b0,λ0) for all t , with
λ0 =ψ(b0).
Proposition 10. Let Assumptions B1 and B2 hold and supposeψbl i ss < γbl i ss . If b0 < bbli ss , debt converges
monotonically to bbl i ss and taxes exhibit a positive drift along the transition. If instead b0 ≥ bbl i ss , debt
stays constant at b0 for ever, and tax smoothing applies.
Proof. Let us first consider b0 ≥ bbl i ss . In this case, V ′(b) =π(b) = 0 and the ODE system reduces to
ḃ = ρb −S(λ)
λ̇= 0
implying that λ and hence the tax rate is perfectly smoothed, so that b stays put at b0. This is the cele-
brated Barro tax smoothing result.
Let us now consider b0 < bbl i ss . Let us first assume that γ(bbl i ss) > ψ(bbl i ss) and define λbli ss =
ψ(bbl i ss). Using the fact that with satiationπ(b) = 0, the approximate local dynamics around the satiation
24One cannot rule out λ0 < 0 for sufficiently low b0. When this is the case, the negative λ signals the high value that the
planner attaches to issuing public debt. In fact, if it were feasible for b to jump, the planner would let b jump to the point where
λ turns non-negative, and only thereafter we she follow the blue path in the figure. By the same token, if we allow the planner
to make non-negative lump-sum transfers, these transfers will not affect the solution in the region where λ> 0, but would help
speed up the accumulation of debt in the region where λ< 0.
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point are given by
Ẋ (t ) = JX (t ) with J =
 ρ − ρψ′(bbl i ss )
V ′′(b)−λbli ssπ′(bbl i ss)(σ(bbl i ss)−1) 0






V ′′(bbl i ss)−ψ(bbl i ss)π′(bbl i ss)(σ(bbl i ss)−1)
)




V ′′(bbli ss)−γ(bbli ss)π′(bbl i ss)(σ(bbli ss)−1)
)
At bbli ss , both V






implying that det(J) < 0. Furthermore, the discriminant of the polynomial associated with the eigenvalue
problem is strictly positive, ∆ = ρ2 −4det(J) > 0. Taken together, these results imply that the two eigen-
values are real, add up to a positive number and are of opposite sign. The local dynamics around the
point (bbli ss ,λbl i ss) therefore satisfy a saddle path property. It is also easy to show that the eigenvector









and is not degenerate as ψ′(b) > 0. In other words, starting from b(0) ∈ {bbl i ss − ε;ε > 0}, there exists a
unique path taking the economy to satiation. This establishes the first part of the proposition.
Let us now consider a situation where γ(bbli ss) < ψ(bbl i ss). In this case, the inequality established
for the determinant of J is reversed and det(J) > 0. The two eigenvalues have the same sign and sum
up to a positive number, and are therefore positive. (bbl i ss ,λbl i ss) is not locally stable and starting from
b < bbl i ss , there exists no path leading the economy towards it.
Let us now consider Figure 8. In this case, γ and ψ intersect exactly once, at b = b∗ ∈ (bsei g n ,bbl i ss).
Let λ∗ ≡ψ(b∗) denote the shadow cost of taxation associated with balancing the budget when b = b∗. By
construction, the pair (b∗,λ∗) identifies the unique steady state of the ODE system (27)-(29) to the left of
the satiation point (i.e., within regions L and M). As is clear from the figure, this steady state is saddle-path
stable. In particular, for any b0 < bbl i ss , we can find a continuous path that satisfies conditions (27)-(29)
and that asymptotically converges to (b∗,λ∗). Exactly the same arguments as in Figure 7 guarantee that
this path is the unique candidate for optimality, and hence also the optimal path, as long as b0 < bbl i ss .
A crucial difference from the case in Figure 7 is that the economy now converges to a steady state
characterized by a debt level that is strictly lower than the satiation level: Proposition 9 applies with b∗ <
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bbl i ss . Consequently, the sign of the drift in debt and taxes now depends on the initial position: if b0 < b∗,
then debt and taxes increase monotonically over time, whereas the converse is true if b0 ∈ (b∗,bbl i ss).
Another important difference concerns the behavior of the system in the region to the right of the
satiation point. In the previous case, the Barro-like plan of keeping taxes and debt constant over time
was the unique candidate for optimality throughout region H, that is, for all b0 > bbl i ss . This is no longer
true. Instead, as it is evident in the figure, for any b0 ∈ [bbli ss ,bski ba), there is an additional candidate for
optimality: the path indicated with blue color in the figure.
This path lets b fall over time, crossing bbl i ss in finite time and asymptotically converging to b
∗.
Accordingly, the economy goes through two phases. In the first phase, which is defined by the time
interval over which b remains above bbl i ss , λ stays constant over time, which means that tax smoothing
applies. Although this resembles Barro (1979), there is a key difference: the constant value of λ exceeds
ψ(b) throughout this phase, which means that taxes are smoothed at a level that is higher than what is
required for balancing the budget (in turn explaining why debt falls over time). In the second phase,
which starts as soon as b has crossed bbl i ss from above, debt continues to fall, but tax smoothing no
longer holds, for the reasons explained earlier on.
By construction, the path described above satisfies the ODE system (27)-(29) at all t and asymptot-
ically converges to (b∗,λ∗), which means that it also satisfies the transversality condition. This verifies
that, as long as it exists, this path is a candidate for optimality. But so is the Barro-like plan of “staying
put” at the point of the graph of ψ that corresponds to the initial level of debt, that is, at (b,λ) = (b0,λ0)
with λ0 =ψ(b0). How can we tell which path is better?
To address this question, we use an elementary but powerful result from optimal-control theory.
Below, we first state the result, which holds true for any configuration of the planner’s problem. We then
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use it to complete the characterization of the particular benchmark under consideration.
For any b0, let P (b0) be the set of all the paths for (b,λ) that start from b0, satisfy the ODE system
in all t , and also satisfy the transversality condition at infinity. Since these conditions are necessary
for optimality, the optimal path is necessarily contained in P (b0). More generally, we can reduce the
planner’s problem to that of choosing a path P (b0). Next, note that any path in P (b0) is associated
with a different initial value for the costate and let Λ(b0) be the set of such initial values for the costate.
Choosing a path in P (b0) is therefore equivalent to choosing an initial value λ0 in Λ(b0). The following
result is helpful for evaluating the welfare associated with any candidate path.
Lemma 4 (Skiba, 1978, Brock and Dechert, 1983). For any b0 and any λ0 ∈Λ(b0), the path in P (b0) that
starts from initial point (b0,λ0) yields a value that is equal to H (b0,λ0)/ρ.
Proof. See Brock and Dechert (1983).
For any given b0, the above result allows one to rank the candidate paths in P (b0) by simply inspect-
ing how the value of the Hamiltonian, H (b0,λ0), varies as λ0 varies within the set Λ(b0). But now note
that H (b,λ) is strictly convex in λ, as it is defined as the upper envelop of functions that are linear in
λ. It follows that, whenever P (b0) is not a singleton, the optimal path is necessarily the path that starts
with λ0 either at the maximal or the minimal value inside Λ(b0). This property is instrumental for iden-
tifying the optimal path starting from any given initial level of debt, not only in the benchmark under
consideration, but also in the more general case studied later.
Let us now go back to Figure 8. Pick any b0 ≥ bbli ss and suppose there exists a continuous path that
satisfies the ODEs and asymptotically converges to b∗. As already noted, this path is a candidate for
optimality. But so is the Barro-like plan that keeps b and λ constant for ever at, respectively, b0 and
ψ(b0). Note, next, that the first plan is associated with a higher λ0 (i.e., higher taxes) than the second,
because the first runs a surplus whereas the second balances the budget. Finally, note that, along any
candidate path, Hλ(b,λ) = ḃ. For the path that leads the economy to b∗, we have that ḃ < 0 at t = 0,
and hence Hλ(b0,λ0) < 0. For the Barro-like plan, instead, ḃ = 0 and hence Hλ(b0,λ0) = 0. Since H is
convex, this means that the Barro-like plan attains the minimum of H over the set of candidate paths.
It follows that, whenever the path that takes the economy to b∗ exists, this path strictly dominates the
Barro-like, and it is the optimal one.
The preceding argument supposes the existence of such a path. Whether such a path exists or not
depends on the initial level of debt, b0. In the figure, it is evident that this is the case if and only if b0 is
lower than the threshold bski ba . But how is this threshold defined in the first place, and what guarantees
its own existence?
Consider b0 = bbli ss . If we initiate the ODE system with a starting value λ(0) slightly above ψbl i ss =
ψ(bbl i ss), which means that we run a sufficiently small enough surplus, then the resulting path for b
never reaches b∗. By contrast, if we start with λ(0) far above ψ(bbl i ss), debt falls below b∗ in finite time.
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Finally, note the path of b induced by the ODE system is continuous and monotonic in λ(0). It follows
that there exists a critical value λski ba ∈ (ψbl i ss ,∞) such that, if we start with λ(0) =λski ba , then and only
then the economy converges asymptotically to b∗.
By continuity, this kind of path also exists for b0 above but close enough to bbli ss . Furthermore,
because the planner’s Euler condition dictates λ̇= 0 (tax smoothing) throughout region H, the plan under
consideration keeps λ constant as long as b is above bbl i ss . It follows that the portion of this path that is
to the right of the satiation point is flat at the level λski ba .
Define next bski ba ∈ (bbl i ss , b̄) as the level of debt that balances the budget when taxes are set at the
level corresponding to λski ba ; that is, bski ba ≡ ψ−1(λski ba). Note that ψ is continuous and monotone,
λbl i ss >ψ(bbli ss), and limb→b̄ψ(b) =∞; this verifies that bski ba exists and is necessarily strictly between
bbli ss and b̄. It is then immediate that a continuous path that satisfies the ODEs and that converges to
b∗ exists if and only if b0 < bski ba , as illustrated in the figure.
We thus have the following complement to Proposition 10.
Proposition 11. Let Assumptions B1 and B2 hold and suppose ψbl i ss > γbl i ss . There exist unique points
b∗ ∈ (bsei g n ,bbl i ss) and bski ba ∈ (bbl i ss , b̄) such as the optimal debt level converges monotonically to b∗ if
b0 < bski ba , whereas it stays constant at b0 for ever if b0 ≥ bski ba . Optimal taxes exhibit a positive drift as
long as b ∈ (bsei g n ,b∗), a negative drift as long as b ∈ (b∗,bbl i ss), and are smoothed as long as b > bbli ss .
Proof. The discussion preceding the proposition in the main text establishes the existence of bski ba by
using a continuity argument. Here we analyze the stability of the steady state (b∗,λ∗).
The linear approximation of the system of the ODEs around a stationary point (b∗,λ∗) is given by
Ẋ (t ) =
 ρ+$V ′(b∗)(σ(b∗)−1) −S′(λ∗)
V ′′(b∗)−λ∗$V ′′(b∗)(σ(b∗)−1)−λ∗$V ′(b∗)σ′(b∗) −$V ′(b∗)(σ(b∗)−1)
 X (t ) = JX (t )
where $≡ π(b)/V ′(b) and X (t ) ≡ (b(t )−b∗,λ(t )−λ∗)′. Using the definitions of the functions ψ(b), γ(b)
and their respective derivatives, the matrix J, evaluated at (b∗,λ∗), is
J =







First note that the trace of matrix J is given by ρ > 0, implying that the two eigenvalues of J sum up to a













Given that b∗ < bbli ss , σ(b∗) < 1, γ(b∗) > 0 and V ′(b∗) > 0. Finally, from Lemma 2, we know that γ′(b) <
0 for b ∈ (bsei g n ,bbl i ss]. Therefore, given that ψ′(b) > 0, det(J) < 0 and hence the two eigenvalues are
distributed around 0. Therefore, (b∗,λ∗) a saddle path stable.
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> 0 is the discriminant of the polynomial. Hence the eigen-











v1 −S′(λ∗)v2 = 0
Consider the eigenvector is
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. Given that V ′(b∗) > 0, γ(b∗) > 0 (since σ(b) > 1) and
S′(λ∗) > 0 in the upward sloping part of the Laffer curve, both components of the vector are positive. The
co-movement result follows: For any ε> 0, starting from b0 = b∗−ε (resp. b0 = b∗+ε) , the economy will
converge to (b∗,λ∗) increasing (resp. decreasing) both debt and taxes along the transition path.
For practical purposes, we think it is appropriate to restrict b0 < bbli ss , so that the financial distor-
tion is present in the initial period. Under this restriction, the combination of Propositions 10 and 11
generates the following two key lessons.
The first lesson is that the economy can belong in one of two classes. In the one, debt converges to
bbli ss , which means that the planner extinguishes the financial distortion in the long run. In the other
class, the opposite is true: the planner preserves the financial distortion in the long run. We will study
below whether and how this taxonomy extends to the general case. For now, we wish to emphasize that
both classes feature a deviation from tax smoothing along the transition.
The second lesson is that the conditionψbl i ss > γbli ss is both necessary and sufficient for an economy
to belong in the second of the aforementioned two classes. In order to derive an interpretation of this
condition recall that ψ(b) measures the value of λ implied by balancing the budget; that γ(b) identifies
the value of λ that balances the planner’s conflicting objectives: when λ > γ(b), then and only then the
value the planner attaches to interest-rate manipulation (or seigniorage) outweighs the value of collateral
creation (or liquidity provision); and finally that ψbl i ss ≡ψ(bbl i ss) and γbl i ss ≡ limb↑bbl i ss γ(b). It follows
that ψbli ss > γbl i ss if and only if Ωb(b,λ) < 0 for (b,λ) close enough to (bbli ss ,ψ(bbli ss)), which leads to
the following simple interpretation.
Fact 1. ψbli ss > γbl i ss if and only if, in the neighborhood of bbli ss , the benefit of relaxing the government
budget by depressing the interest rate on public debt exceeds the cost of the financial distortion.
The proof of Proposition 9 is then completed by noting that ψbl i ss > γbl i ss if and only if g is high
enough, a property that holds even outside our benchmark and that is proved in Lemma 5 below.
But: Do the lessons obtained above apply outside the benchmark under consideration? We address
this question next.
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B.3 Beyond the Benchmark
The benchmark studied above has two key properties: π(b)b is singled-peaked, so that the phase diagram
can be organized in the three regions described above; and γ is decreasing over the region M, so that it
can intersect at most once withψ. If we modified the benchmark by allowing either for a non-monotone
σ or for V ′ 6=π but maintained the aforementioned properties, then the preceding arguments go through
and Propositions 10 and 11 continue to hold.
What if the aforementioned properties do not hold, as it may be the case for certain micro-foundations?
There is a plethora of possibilities. To make progress, we will continue for a moment to assume thatπ(b)b
is single-peaked, which preserves the tripartite structure of the phase diagram, but will let γ(b) be non-
monotone over region M .25 In this case, the graphs of γ andψmay intersect multiple times. Clearly, any
such intersection identifies a steady-state point of the ODE system. What are the local dynamics around
each of these points? Starting from a given initial b0, how many paths are candidates for optimality? And
what are the properties of the optimal path?
There is a multitude of possible answers to these questions. To illustrate, consider the case in which γ
and ψ happen to intersect three times, giving rise to three steady-state points for the ODE system within
region M. Figures 9, 10 and 11 below illustrate three phase diagrams that are consistent with this case.
The three diagrams feature similar configurations of the γ and ψ functions and similar local dynam-
ics around each of the three steady states, but different global dynamics and different types of optimal
policies. We go over each of these three possibilities one by one.
Consider Figure 9. In order to simplify the exposition, we truncate region L, where b < bsei g n , γ is
negatively valued, and there can be no steady state; we thus focus on region M, where b ∈ (bsei g n ,bbli ss)
and where γ and ψ intersect three times. Denote the level of debt at the three intersection points by b∗L ,
b∗M , and b
∗
H (for, respectively, “low”, “medium”, and “high”). Because γ goes to infinity in the neighbor-
hood of bsei g n , we know that γ must intersect ψ from above at b∗L and b
∗
H , and from below at b
∗
M . This is
useful to note, because, as shown in the next proposition, the relation between the slope of γ and that of
ψ dictates the local stability properties of the ODE system around any steady state.
Proposition 12. Consider any (b∗,λ∗) such that λ∗ = γ(b∗) =ψ(b∗), that is any steady-state point of the
ODE system in the region to the left of the satiation point. There exists a finite scalar χ > 0 such that the
local dynamics around that steady-state point are
(i) saddle-path stable if γ′(b∗) <ψ′(b∗);
(ii) explosive with real eigenvalues if ψ′(b∗) < γ′(b∗) <ψ′(b∗)+χ;
(iii) explosive with imaginary eigenvalues (i.e. with cycles) if γ′(b∗) >ψ′(b∗)+χ.
25Recall that γ is necessarily decreasing in a neighborhood to the right of bsei g n , because σ(b) ↓ 1 and γ(b) ↑∞ as b ↓ bbli ss .
Allowing for a non-monotone γ therefore means that γ is increasing over a portion of region M. This in turn can happen when
the elasticity σ and/or that the ratio π/V ′ is decreasing over a subset of (bsei g n ,bbl i ss ).
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Proof. The linear approximation of the system of the ODEs around a stationary point (b],λ]) is given by
Ẋ (t ) =
 ρ+π(b∗)(σ(b∗)−1) −S′(λ∗)
V ′′(b∗)−λ∗π′(b∗)(σ(b∗)−1)−λ∗π(b∗)σ′(b∗) −π(b∗)(σ(b∗)−1)
 X (t ) = JX (t )
with X (t ) = (b(t )−b∗,λ(t )−λ∗)′. Using the definitions of the functions ψ(b), γ(b), ψ′(b) and γ′(b), we
can rewrite the matrix J, evaluated at (b∗,λ∗) as
J =







First note that the trace of matrix J is given by ρ > 0, implying that the two eigenvalues of J sum up to a













Given that b∗ < bbli ss , σ(b∗) < 1, γ(b∗) > 0 and V ′(b∗) > 0. Therefore, the position of γ′(b∗)/ψ′(b∗)
with respect to 1 determines the sign of the determinant, and hence the position of the two eigenvalues
around 0. Note that a steady state only exists in regions where σ(b∗) > 1 and hence γ(b∗) > 0. When
γ′(b∗) <ψ′(b∗), det(J) < 0 and hence the two eigenvalues are distributed around 0. Therefore, a saddle
path exists (recall that Tr(J) = ρ > 0), hence proving the first statement. In the opposite situation the two
eigenvalues have positive real part, hence establishing the explosiveness part of the proposition.
The emergence of cycles is related to the real vs complex nature of the eigenvalues. This is established
by looking at the discriminant, ∆, of the characteristic polynomial:












The two roots are complex if the discriminant is negative








Therefore establishing the condition for the emergence of complex vs real explosive eigenvalues.
This result restricts the local dynamics of the ODE system in the neighborhood of any steady state
point, i.e. around the intersections of γ and ψ. Consistent with this result, Figure 9 imposes that the
lowest and the highest steady states (b∗L and b
∗
H ) are saddle-path stable, while letting the middle one
(b∗M ) feature explosive cycles.
Notwithstanding these restrictions on the local dynamics, there remain three distinct possibilities
with regard to the global dynamics. Figure 9 considers one of these possibilities.
In Figure 9, we have imposed the following property on the global dynamics: both the stable arm that
leads to b∗L from above and the one that leads to b
∗
H from below cycle back to b
∗
M . It follows that there exist
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values b̃ and ˜̃b, as indicated in the figure, such that the following is true within region M. Whenever b0 < b̃,
Λ(b0) is a singleton and the unique candidate for optimality is the saddle path that leads to b∗L . Whenever
b > ˜̃b,Λ(b0) is again a singleton, but now the unique candidate is the saddle path that leads to b∗H . Finally,
whenever b0 ∈ [b̃, ˜̃b], there are multiple paths that are candidates for optimality. For instance, if we take
b0 = b̂ as indicated in the figure, one candidate is obtained by setting λ0 = λ̂1 ≡ maxΛ(b0) and letting
debt decrease monotonically towards b∗L ; another candidate is obtained by setting λ0 = λ̂2 = minΛ(b0)
and letting debt increase monotonically towards b∗H ; and yet another candidate is obtained by setting
λ0 = λ̂3 and letting debt to cycle twice around b̂ before eventually converging to b∗H . The closer b0 is to
b∗M , the larger the number of candidates; when b0 is exactly b
∗
M , there is actually a countable infinity of
candidates.
At first glance, the task of comparing candidate paths seems daunting. Fortunately, Lemma 4 and the
convexity of the Hamiltonian with respect λ guarantee that only the paths associated with the extremes
of Λ(b0) can be optimal. For any b0 ∈ [b̃, ˜̃b], we can thus rule out cycles and restrict attention to just two
candidate paths, namely the paths that let b converge monotonically either to b∗L or to b
∗
H . To rank these
two candidate paths, we proceed as follows.
First, recall that the value of any candidate path is given by the Hamiltonian as described in Lemma
4; that the Hamiltonian is convex in λ; and that its derivative is given by Hλ = ḃ. Next, consider the value
of ḃ at each of the two candidate paths. For all b0 ∈ [b̃, ˜̃b), the path that leads to the lowest steady state
starts from a point above the graph ofψ, meaning that ḃ < 0. But as b0 gets closer to ˜̃b, the starting points
gets closer to the graph of ψ, meaning that value of ḃ gets closer to 0. In the knife-edge case in which
b0 = ˜̃b, this path is associated with ḃ = 0. Conversely, the path that leads to the highest steady state is
associated with ḃ > 0 for all b0 ∈ (b̃, ˜̃b], and with ḃ = 0 in the reverse knife-edge case in which b0 = b̃.
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Combining these observations, we obtain the following properties. When b0 = b̃, the path that leads
to b∗L features Hλ = ḃ < 0, whereas the path that leads to b∗H features Hλ = ḃ = 0. By the convexity of H ,
the latter path is dominated. Conversely, when b0 = ˜̃b, it is the former path that now features Hλ = ḃ = 0
and that is therefore dominated. By continuity,26 the path that leads to b∗L is therefore optimal for b0
close enough to b̃, whereas the path that leads to b∗H is optimal for b0 close enough to
˜̃b. Finally, the
assumption that U is convex in s guarantees that the optimal path for b is monotone. It follows that there
exists a threshold b̂ ∈ (b̃, ˜̃b) such that the unique optimal path is the path leading to the lowest steady state
whenever b0 < b̂ and it is the path leading to the higher steady state whenever b0 > b̂. See Figure 9 for
an illustration: the bold segments of the two stable arms indicate the optimal selection among the two
candidate paths.27
So far, we focused on region M. In region H (b0 ≥ bbl i ss), the analysis is similar to Figure 8. That is,
there is a threshold bski ba ∈ (bbl i ss , b̄) such that, as long as b0 ∈ (bbl i ss ,bski ba), there are two candidate
paths, the one leading to b∗H and the Barro-like one, and the former dominates the latter, whereas the
latter is the only candidate for b0 ≥ bski ba . Finally, in region L (b0 < bsei g n), there is a unique candidate
path, one leading to b∗L .
The kind of optimal policy illustrated in Figure 9 has the following properties: (i) whenever b0 < b̂,
debt converges monotonically to b∗L ; (ii) whenever b0 ∈ (b̂,bski ba), debt converges monotonically to b∗H ;
and (iii) whenever b0 ≥ bski ba , debt stays constant at b0 for ever. Comparing this result to our earlier
benchmark, we see that one key property survives whereas another is lost: as in our benchmark, it is true
that there exists a threshold bski ba > bbl i ss such that debt converges to a steady-state level below bbl i ss
whenever the economy starts below bski ba ; but unlike our benchmark, the steady-state level is not the
same for all initial conditions.
We now turn to two variants of the case studied in Figure 9. One of these variants is illustrated in
Figure 10, the other in Figure 11. These variants maintain the same qualitative configuration for the
functions γ andψ, the same steady-state points, and the same local dynamics around them, but perturb
the global dynamics. One of the stable arms is now allowed to extend throughout region M instead of
cycling back to b∗M . This path then emerges as the optimal path for all initial conditions: in the case seen
in Figure 10), it is optimal to converge to b∗H for all b0 < bski ba ; and in the case seen in Figure 11, it is
optimal to converge to b∗L .
Let us fill in the details, starting with Figure 10. Unlike Figure 9, the stable arm corresponding to
the highest steady state no longer cycles back to b∗M ; instead, it extends past b
∗
L . This has the following
important implication. If we consider b0 = b∗L , then there are two candidate optimal plans, namely the
26Here, we take for granted the continuity of the value of each candidate path with respect to b0; for a general proof of this
property, see Dechert and Nishimura (1981).
27In the optimal-control literature, any threshold level of the state variable at which the solution switches from one to another
candidate path, such as the threshold b̂ here, is often referred to as a “Skiba point”. In our paper, we reserve the notation bski ba
to refer only to the highest such threshold.
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plan of staying put at b∗L and the plan that leads to b
∗
H . The former plan is dominated because it features
Hλ = ḃ = 0, whereas the latter features Hλ = ḃ > 0. By continuity, the saddle path that leads to b∗L is
dominated also for any b0 in an open neighborhood of b∗L . But then the path leading to b
∗
L can never be
optimal: if the economy were to follow this path starting from any initial point b0, the economy would
enter the aforementioned neighborhood in finite time; at that point, switching paths would increase wel-
fare, which contradicts the optimality of the original path. We conclude that, contrary to what happens
in Figure 9, the path that leads to b∗H in Figure 10 is now the optimal path for all b0 < bski ba .
Consider next Figure 11. This illustrates a diametrically opposite scenario from that shown in Figure
10: it is now the stable arm that leads to b∗L that fails to cycle back to b
∗
M , extends past b
∗
H , and dominates
throughout. What the two scenarios share in common that distinguishes from the scenario depicted in
Figure 9 is the following: even though the ODE system continues to admit multiple saddle-path stable
steady states, the optimal policy now features a unique and globally stable steady state in the region to
the left of the satiation point, that is, optimal debt converges monotonically to the same long run value
b? for all initial values b0 ≤ bbli ss .
These findings illustrate the following more general points and qualify some of the properties of the
benchmark model. To the extent that the ODE system admits multiple steady states below bbl i ss , any
such point represents a point of indifference between the desire to depress the interest rate on public
debt and the desire to improve liquidity and efficiency; this is our earlier observation that Ωb = 0 at
any such point. Furthermore, to the extent that such a point is locally saddle-path stable, it is optimal
to converge to it over time if the economy starts in a small enough neighborhood of this point and if
in addition the planner is precluded from moving outside that neighborhood. In this regard, the local
optimality of the steady state can be understood by inspecting the trade off between collateral creation
and interest rate manipulation, as what we did in our benchmark. However, once the planner is free to
move from one steady state to another, such local intuitions are no longer sufficient. Moreover, as we
show below, there is no guarantee that the steady state can be rationalized as either a global or a local
maximum ofΩ, despite the fact that it satisfiesΩb = 0.
The number of possible scenarios would increase if we allowed γ and ψ to intersect more than three
times. Yet an additional layer of complexity emerges if the assumption that π(b)b is single-valued is re-
laxed. The tripartite structure of the phase diagram is then lost. Instead, the phase diagram now looks
like the outcome of patching together multiple pairs of L and M regions from our earlier examples. How-
ever, as explained next, this complication does not change the big picture.
Suppose that π(b)b has N local extrema, denoted by {b1,b2,b3, . . . ,bN }, with b < b1 < b2 < . . . < bN <
bbli ss , where N is an arbitrary finite number. First, note that σ(b) crosses 1 whenever b crosses any of
these points. Next, note that the last point, namely bN , is necessarily a local maximum, because after that
point π(b)b falls to zero as b approaches bbl i ss . It follows that σ(b) is higher than 1 when b ∈ (bN ,bbl i ss),
lower than 1 when b ∈ (bN−1,bN ), higher than 1 when b ∈ (bN−2,bN−1), and so on. By the same token, γ
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is positively valued b ∈ (bN ,bbl i ss), negatively valued than 1 when b ∈ (bN−1,bN ), positively valued when
b ∈ (bN−2,bN−1), and so on.
We illustrate this in Figure 12. As anticipated above, the phase diagram now looks like the product
of patching together multiple pairs of L and M regions from our earlier examples. But the earlier lessons
survive in the following sense: if the economy starts inside any of the L regions, it is optimal to exit this
region in finite time and thereafter converge asymptotically either to an intersection point of γ and ψ
within one of the M regions or to satiation.
Figure 12: Multiple Regions
M L M H
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ḃ = 0






Notwithstanding all the complexity, we can thus establish the following result, which offers a quali-
fied generalization of Proposition 11 in our benchmark.
Proposition 13. Suppose ψbl i ss > γbl i ss . There exists a threshold bski ba > bbl i ss such that, for every b0 <
bski ba , the optimal policy lets debt converge monotonically to a point strictly below bbli ss .
Proof. By a similar argument as in Dechert and Nishimura (1981), the optimal path for b is monotone,
for any initial condition. Because b is bounded between b and b̄, this also means that b converges. The
limit point may depend on the initial level of debt. Nevertheless, it is necessarily contained either in the
set B∗ or in the interval [bbl i ss , b̄).
Let b‡ ∈ (0,bbli ss) be the last local maximum of π(b)b.28 By construction of b‡, γ(b) > 0 for all b ∈
(b‡,bbl i ss) and limb↓b‡ γ(b) =+∞>ψ(b‡). By the assumption that γbl i ss <ψbli ss along with the continu-
28Because π(b)b is strictly positive for all b ∈ (0,bbl i ss ) and converges to zero as b approaches either 0 from above or bbl i ss
from below, we know that there exists ε> 0 such that π(b)b is increasing for b ∈ (0,ε) and decreasing for b ∈ (bbl i ss − ε,bbl i ss ).
Because the derivative of π(b)b is −(σ(b)−1)π(b), the aforementioned property means that σ(b) < 1 for b ∈ (0,ε) and σ(b) > 1
for b ∈ (bbl i ss −ε,bbl i ss ). By the continuity of σ, then, the threshold b‡ exists and is strictly between 0 and bbl i ss .
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ity and differentiability of γ and ψ, there exists at least one point b∗ ∈ (b‡,bbl i ss) such that γ(b∗) =ψ(b∗)
and γ′(b∗) <ψ′(b∗), that is, a steady-state point in which γ intersects ψ from above. If there are multi-
ple such points, consider the highest one. By Proposition 12, we know that this steady state is saddle-
path stable. Similarly to Figure 8, the following is therefore true: there exists a threshold bski ba > bbl i ss
and a scalar ε > 0 such that, whenever b0 ∈ (b∗− ε,bski ba), there exists path that satisfies the ODE sys-
tem at all t and that asymptotically leads to b∗. Clearly, this path is a candidate for optimality for all
b0 ∈ (b∗− ε,bski ba). Furthermore, this path dominates the Barro-like plan for all b0 ∈ [bbli ss ,bski ba). Fi-
nally, there is no candidate path that leads to satiation when b0 < bbl i ss , thanks again to the assumption
that γbl i ss <ψbl i ss .
All these facts obtain by applying the same arguments as in our benchmark. What is different is
that we no longer know (i) whether the path that leads to b∗ ceases to exist for b0 low enough and (ii)
whether this path is itself dominated by another candidate path in a region of b0. Notwithstanding these
possibilities, any other candidate path must itself be a saddle path leading to one of the intersection
points of γ and ψ. By construction of b∗, any other such point is strictly below b∗. It follows that, no
matter the initial level of debt and no matter which candidate path is the optimal one, debt converges to
a point that does not exceed b∗, which proves the claim.29
B.4 The conditionψbl i ss > γbl i ss
In the preceding analysis, the condition ψbl i ss > γbl i ss played a crucial role: it guaranteed that it is op-
timal to lead the economy to a steady state below satiation not only for all initial levels of debt below
bbli ss , but also over a range of initial levels above it. This generalized the related insight from the main
text.
As already explained, the condition ψbli ss > γbli ss has a simple interpretation: it means that, in the
neighborhood of bbl i ss , the shadow cost of taxation is sufficiently high so that the marginal value of de-
pressing the interest rate on public debt outweighs the marginal cost of the financial distortion. Consis-
tent with this interpretation, it is straightforward to show this case obtains when the level of government
spending is sufficiently high.30
Lemma 5. Suppose γbli ss <∞. There exists a threshold ĝ such that ψbl i ss > γbl i ss if and only if g > ĝ .
Proof. Note that ψbl i ss is continuous and increasing in g as long as g < gmax and diverges to +∞ as
g → gmax . This is because a higher g requires higher taxes to balance the budget, and the marginal cost
29This argument mirrors Theorem 2 in Brock and Dechert (1983). Applied to our setting, this theorem states that, whenever
the policy rule of the costate features a discontinuous jump, this jump is downward. By the same token, as we move from higher
to lower levels of debt, the costate can only jump upwards, which means that lower levels of debt are necessarily associated with
convergence to weakly lower steady states.
30In fact, the threshold ĝ in the lemma can be negative in some economies, implying that, in these economies, this result
obtains for all positive levels of government spending.
45
of these taxes explodes to infinity as we approach the peak of the Laffer curve. Furthermore, ψbl i ss = 0
if and only if g = −ρbbli ss < 0. Finally, note that γbl i ss is (i) invariant to g ; (ii) positive for the reasons
offered above; and (iii) finite by assumption. It then follows that there exists a threshold ĝ , necessarily
less than gmax and possibly negative, such that ψbl i ss > γbl i ss if and only if g > ĝ .
This generalizes the related point made in the main text. The only subtlety is the following. In the
benchmark studied in the main text,ψbli ss > γbl i ss (and by the same token g > ĝ ) was both sufficient and
necessary for bski ba > bbl i ss and, equivalently, for the existence of a steady state below satiation. Suffi-
ciency was established in Proposition 11, necessity in Proposition 10. In the more general case allowed
here, sufficiency remains valid by Proposition 13, but necessity may not apply.
Figure 13: No Satiation Despite ψbl i ss < γbl i ss (or g low enough)
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We illustrate this in Figure 13. As in our benchmark (see Figure 7 in particular), letting γbli ss >ψbl i ss
guarantees the local existence of a candidate path that leads to satiation: for some ε > 0 and all b0 ∈
(b0 − ε,bbli ss), there exists a path that satisfies the ODEs at all dates and that asymptotically converges
to bbli ss . But unlike what was true in our benchmark, this type of path does not exist for sufficiently low
b0. What is more, for all b0 < bbli ss , there happens to exist another candidate optimal path, namely the
one that leads to a steady state below bbl i ss . Finally, note that the path leading to bbli ss features an initial
value for ḃ that is arbitrarily close to 0 when b0 is close enough to bbli ss , whereas the path leading to
b∗L features a ḃ bounded way from zero. Using once again Lemma 4, the convexity of H in λ, and the
fact that Hλ = ḃ, we infer that the latter path dominates the former for b0 in a neighborhood of bbli ss .
But this also means that the path leading to satiation can not be optimal for any initial b0. Instead, there
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again exists a bski ba > bbl i ss such that for all b0 < bski ba it is optimal to converge either to b∗L or to some
point further below.
To sum up, away from the benchmarks studied in the main text, g high enough may not be necessary
for the existence of a steady state below satiation. But it is always sufficient for this to be true, and this is
what we think of as the most interesting scenario.
B.5 Complete Characterization
Building on the preceding results, we can now offer a characterization of the optimal policy that nests all
possible scenarios. To this goal, we henceforth let
B # ≡ {b ∈ (b,bbl i ss] : γ(b) =ψ(b) and γ′(b) ≤ψ′(b)}
be the set of the points at which γ intersects ψ from above. As shown in Proposition 12, these points
identify the saddle-path stable steady states of the ODE system.31 Depending on primitives, B # may
be empty, or may contain an arbitrary number of elements.32 Regardless of this, we have the following
result.
Theorem 2. In every economy, there exists a threshold bski ba ∈ [b,b] and a set B∗ ⊆ B # such that the
following are true along the optimal policy:
(i) If either b0 ∈ B∗ or b0 > max{bbli ss ,bski ba}, debt stays constant at b0 for ever.
(ii) If b0 < bski ba and b0 ∉ B∗, then debt converges monotonically to a point inside B∗.
(iii) If bski ba < bbl i ss and b0 ∈ (bski ba ,bbli ss), debt converges monotonically to bbl i ss .
Proof. We prove this result with the help of Theorem 2 from Brock and Dechert (1983). Consider the
optimal policy rule for the co-state variable, namely the correspondence from any given b0 to the opti-
mal value for λ0. Denote this correspondence by Λopt . Note that this is is a selection from the corre-
spondence Λ (which was defined in the context of Lemma 4). To illustrate, consider Figure 9. In this
example, the aforementioned correspondence is given by the combination of three segments: the thick
green line on the left of b̂, plus the solid blue line between b̂ and bski ba , plus the segment of the graph
of the ḃ = 0 locus that rests on the right of bski ba . As it is evident in this example, the correspondence
λ∗ is single-valued and continuous for all b0 other than b̂; the discontinuity at b̂ reflects a switch in
the optimal selection among different candidate paths. Moving beyond this specific example, the pol-
icy rule for the co-state can feature multiple such discontinuities. Any such discontinuity, however, has
31In knife-edge cases in which a steady state of the ODE system features γ′(b) = ψ′(b), we can not be sure of saddle-path
stability. Clearly, such knife-edge cases are degenerate. In any event, they do not affect the validity of the result stated below,
because this result allows B∗ to be a strict subset of B#.
32We wish to think of the empirically relevant case as one in which B# contains either a single or a “small” finite number of
points. At the present level of abstraction, however, the best we can say is that B# is generically countable.
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to involve a jump in a specific direction: applied to our setting, Theorem 2 from Brock and Dechert
(1983) states that, at any point b̂ such that limb↑b̂Λ
opt (b) 6= limb↓b̂Λopt (b), it is necessarily the case that
limb↑b̂Λ
opt (b) > limb↓b̂Λopt (b),33 In other words, as we move from higher to lower levels of debt, the
co-state can only jump upwards, which means that the rate of taxation and the level of government sur-
pluses must also jump upwards. It then follows that lower initial conditions are necessarily associated
with convergence to lower steady states, which in turn is the key to the result.
Thus suppose there exists an initial point b0 = b̃0 such that it is optimal to converge to a point b∗ <
bbli ss . Clearly, b
∗ must be inside B #. Next, consider the set of points at which the policy rule of the co-
state features a discontinuity and let b̂ be the highest such point below b∗; if no such point exists, just let
b̂ = b. When b0 ∈ (b̂, b̃0), debt converges to b∗. When instead b0 < b̂ (which, of course, is relevant only
insofar as b̂ > b), debt converges to a point that is below b̂, and hence also below b∗, but still inside B #. It
follows that there exists a point bski ba ≥ b∗ such that, when b0 ≤ bski ba , then and only then it is optimal
to converge to a point inside B #.
The above argument presumed the existence of an initial point at which it became optimal to con-
verge to a point below bbl i ss . If no such initial point exists, we simply let bski ba = b. This completes the
proof of part (ii) of our theorem.
To prove part (iii), recall from Proposition 13 that ψbl i ss > γbli ss is sufficient for bski ba > bbl i ss . It fol-
lows that bski ba < bbl i ss is possible only insofar as ψbl i ss < γbl i ss , which in turn guarantees the existence
of a candidate path that converges to bbl i ss for any b0 ∈ [b̂,bbli ss) and some b̂ < bbl i ss . Clearly, b̂ ≤ bski ba .
By definition of bski ba , the optimal path is one of the candidate paths that converge to a point inside B
#
if and only if b0 < bski ba . Therefore, for any b0 ∈ [bski ba ,bbl i ss), either the path that leads to bbl i ss is the
unique candidate path, or it dominates any of the candidate paths that lead to a point inside B #.
Turning to part (i), note that this contains two subparts: one regarding b0 ∈ B∗, and another regarding
b0 ≥ max{bski ba ,bbl i ss}. Once part (ii) of the theorem is established, the first of the aforementioned two
subparts is trivial: it merely identifies B∗ as the set of the steady states of the optimal policy that happen
to lie below bbl i ss . The second subpart, on the other hand, is proved by the following variant of the proof
of part (ii). As long as b0 ≥ bbl i ss , there necessarily exists a Barro-like candidate path that keeps the level
of debt constant at its initial value and the premium at zero for ever. Whenever another candidate path
exists, it converges to a point inside B #. By definition of bski ba , such an path is optimal if and only if
b0 < bski ba . It follows that, whenever b0 ≥ max{bbl i ss ,bski ba}, either the aforementioned Barro-like path
is the unique candidate path or it dominates any alternative path.
The point bski ba is a threshold in the state space such that it is optimal to satiate the private sector’s
demand for collateral—and eliminate the financial distortion—in the long run if and only if the initial
33At first glance, the original version of Theorem 2 in Brock and Dechert (1983) appears to state the opposite; the apparent
contradiction is resolved by noting that our co-state variable is defined with the opposite sign than theirs.
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level of public debt exceeds this threshold. The set B∗, on the other hand, identifies the set of the steady-
state points of the optimal policy—aka the optimal steady states—that lie below the satiation point.
When B∗ is a singleton, debt converges to the unique point in B∗ for all b0 < bski ba . When instead
B∗ contains multiple points, each such point is associated with a basin of attraction around it, and the
union of all these basins equals [b,bski ba).
Clearly, B∗ has to be a subset of B #, but the two need not coincide: it is possible that the planner
never finds optimal to converge to some, or even any of the points in B #. For instance, whereas B∗ = B #
in Figures 8 and 9, B∗ is a strict subset of B # in Figures 10 and 11.
Finally, it is generally possible that B∗ =;, meaning that satiation obtains in the long run regardless
of initial conditions. But as already explained, this scenario is possible only if g is low enough, orψbl i ss <
γbl i ss . Conversely, g high enough suffices for for the economy to admit at least one steady state below
satiation—and this is the case we find most interesting.
We conclude with the following clarification: Proposition 2 identifies a set of possible scenarios for
the optimal policy, but does not specify whether each of these scenarios does obtain for some economies.
The next result completes the picture by offering a complete taxonomy of all the economies under con-
sideration and of all possibilities that do obtain for some specification of U ,V and π.
Theorem 3. Any economy belongs to one of the following three non-empty classes:
(i) Economies in which B∗ =; and bski ba = b.
(ii) Economies in which B∗ 6= ; and bski ba ∈ (b,bbl i ss).
(iii) Economies in which B∗ 6= ; and bski ba > bbli ss .
Furthermore, g high enough is sufficient for an economy to belong to the last class.
Proof. That any economy must belong to one of these three classes follows from Theorem 2. That
the first and the third classes are not empty follows from the examples we have already considered;
an example of the second class was provided above. Finally, the claimed sufficiency of the condition
ψbl i ss > γbli ss follows from Proposition 13.
B.6 Local Dynamics and Local Comparative Statics
We conclude this Appendix with two additional results. The first result establishes that, in a neighbor-
hood of any steady state below satiation, debt and taxes co-move along the transition to it. The second
result offers a general result on the comparative statics of the model.
Proposition 14. For any b∗ ∈ B∗ there exists ε> 0 such that the following is true: if b0 ∈ (b∗− ε,b∗), then
both debt and taxes increase over time; and if b0 ∈ (b∗,b∗+ε), then both debt and taxes decrease over time.
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Proof. By the definition of b∗ ∈ B? and b∗ < bbl i ss , we know that the point (b∗,λ∗ ≡ ψ(b∗)) is locally
stable. Similarly to Proposition 12, the local dynamics are given by
Ẋ (t ) =
 ρ+π(b∗)(σ(b∗)−1) −S′(λ∗)
V ′′(b∗)−λ∗π′(b∗)(σ(b∗)−1)−λ∗π(b∗)σ′(b∗) −π(b∗)(σ(b∗)−1)
 X (t ) = JX (t )
















v1 −S′(λ∗)v2 = 0
An eigenvector is
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. Given that V ′(b∗) > 0, γ(b∗) > 0 (since σ(b∗) > 1) and S′(λ∗) >
0 in the upward sloping part of the Laffer curve, both components of the vector are positive. The co-
movement result follows: For any ε > 0, starting from b0 = b∗−ε (resp. b0 = b∗+ε) , the economy will
converge to (b∗,λ∗) increasing (resp. decreasing) both debt and taxes along the transition path.
Proposition 15. Let v(·) =ωπ(·) and holdσ(·) constant. For any b∗ ∈ B∗, b∗ increases with a small enough
increase in ω, a small enough decrease in g , or a small enough increase in π(·).
Proof. Any b∗ ∈ B∗ is such that γ(b∗) =φ(b∗). Therefore, it inherits the comparative statics of the γ and
φ functions described in Section B.1.
These two results together imply that, at least for small changes in the primitives of the economy,
the relevant trade off, the nature of transitional dynamics, and the comparative statics of the optimal
long-run quantity of debt are the same as those discussed in the main text.
C Additional Results
C.1 Private versus social value of liquidity
Consider the micro-founded model of Section 2. Let a(θ,b) and P (b) denote the allocation of the bond
and the price of the afternoon good that obtains from solving the planning sub-problem (36)-(44) re-
ported in Section D and, to simplify, let a(θ,b) > −φ for all θ. From the definition of V (·) together with











From the household’s Euler condition (43), we have that Q(b) =β+Ua(·) for all θ. From the bond market
clearing condition (Equation 38), we have
´
ab(θ,b)ϕ(θ)dθ = 1. Using these last two relations, we infer
that
V ′(b) =π(b)+e(b),
where π(b) ≡Q(b)−β is the market premium and e(b) ≡ ´ Up (.)ϕ(θ)dθPb(b) is the relevant externality.
Finally, it can be shown that
´
Up (.)ϕ(θ)dθ and Pb(b) are strictly negative and strictly positive when the
collateral constraint binds with positive probability, and zero otherwise. The intuition is simple: as long
as the constraint binds, a higher b means a higher P because it facilitates a more efficient allocation of the
morning good. A higher price has a negative aggregate welfare effect because it tightens the constraint
and distorts the allocation. As long as the constraint binds, we therefore have e(b) < 0, or equivalently
π(b) >V ′(b).
C.2 Allowing for state-contingent debt
We now discuss how our analysis qualifies the insights of Lucas and Stokey (1983). Relative to Barro and
AMSS, the key difference in Lucas and Stokey (1983) is the availability of state-contingent debt. This
makes it feasible for the government to completely insulate its budget against any shock. But is it desir-
able to do so?
The answer to this question is unambiguously “yes” in Lucas and Stokey (1983). This is because the
transfers implemented by state-contingent debt are non-distortionary, so that the planner necessarily
prefers them to any variation in the distortionary tax. This also explains why Lucas and Stokey (1983)
find that the tax distortion is smoothed, not only across dates, but also across states; or, by the same
token, why the optimal allocation is history-independent, in sharp contrast to the unit-root persistence
predicted by Barro and AMSS.
The answer differs in our setting. When state-contingent debt is available, our planner maintains the
option to equate the shadow cost of taxation across different histories of shocks, exactly as in Lucas and
Stokey (1983). But unlike that environment, the planner no longer finds it optimal to do so. Instead, he
finds it optimal to deviate from tax smoothing across states, in a manner that resembles the departure
from smoothing taxes across dates in the deterministic model.
The rationale is simple. In order to eliminate variation in the shadow cost of taxation, the planner
would have to endure a non-trivial variation in the aggregate collateral, or liquidity, of the private sector.
Starting from this reference point, a small mean-preserving reduction in the variation of the value of
government liabilities leads to a second-order welfare loss in terms of increased variation in the cost
of taxation but to a first-order welfare gain in terms of reduced variation in the social value of liquidity
and/or seigniorage collected. It follows that the optimal policy accommodates some variation in the
tax distortion in order to smooth the supply of liquidity to the private sector. But this also means that
the economy behaves as if the planner did not have access to a complete set of state contingent debt
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instruments: the optimal tax and the optimal allocation depend on the history of fiscal shocks as if those
were (partially) uninsurable.
We illustrate this property in Figure 14 using a persistent war. This is exactly the same as in the
bottom of Figure 3, except that now debt is allowed to be state-contingent. The black lines give the
impulse responses of the market value of debt and the tax rate in our model; the orange lines give their
Lucas-Stokey counterparts, i.e., those that obtain in the absence of the financial friction. In both cases,
the market value of debt jumps down in response to the war, reflecting the state-contingency of the debt
burden. But the drop is more modest in the presence of the financial friction (black line), reflecting the
planner’s desire to limit the reduction in aggregate collateral. By the same token, the planner in our
setting opts to raise more taxes during the war, while in the Lucas-Stokey benchmark the tax rate does
not change at all.
Figure 14: Response to a war shock, with state-contingent debt

















Our Model; Lucas-Stokey; Government Spending Shock
To sum up, once public debt is non-neutral for the reasons we have accommodated in this paper, the
difference between Barro/AMSS and Lucas-Stokey is attenuated: the qualitative response of the optimal
tax and the optimal allocation is the same whether the government has access to state-contingent debt
or not.
C.3 On the Friedman Rule
Our analysis departs from that in the Friedman-rule literature by allowing all types of government-issued
assets, rather than a subset of them, to facilitate private liquidity. This assumption seems both appro-
priate for the issues we are addressing and realistic (see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) for
corroborating evidence). To elaborate on the role played by this assumption, we now consider a modifi-
cation of our baseline model that helps nest the case studied in the Friedman-rule literature.
Suppose that the government enacts a law that prohibits the use of corporate bonds as collateral in
morning transactions. This restriction adds a constraint to the planner’s sub-problem defined in (36)-
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(44) and results in a change in the functions V and π. By shutting the private supply of collateral down
the law may reduce V and increase π, so it has ambiguous welfare implications. But its effect on the
price of corporate bonds is unambiguous: they are now priced at the discount factor, while government
bonds command a premium over the discount factor. Our model is now directly comparable to those in
the Friedman rule literature, with government bonds playing the role of money and corporate bonds the
role of the non-money asset.
Suppose next that the government can not only borrow in the money-like asset (here, government
bonds), but also invest freely in the non-money asset (here, corporate bonds). Then, public debt is given
by b = m +n, where m is the stock of government bonds and −n is the quantity of corporate bonds held
by the government. The budget constraint is given by
ṁ + ṅ = [ρ−π(m)]m +ρn + g − s,
or equivalently
ḃ = ρb −π(m)m + g −S(τ), (31)
where π(m)m is seigniorage and S(τ) is tax revenue. The following is evident: For any given b,π(m)m, g ,
the government can vary the mixture of taxes and new debt issued that satisfies its budget without af-
fecting either the level of private sector liquidity or the interest rate on public debt. Moreover, the latter
is now equal to the discount rate.
Therefore, when the government varies b, it does not face the key trade off present in our model. By
the same token, the optimal supply of liquidity is disentangled from the optimal dynamics of debt and
taxes, and the latter are determined in exactly the same fashion as in Barro (1979).





e−ρt [π(m)m +S(τ)]dt . (32)
where G ≡ ´ +∞0 e−ρt g dt is the present value of government spending. The planner’s problem reduces to
finding the paths of m and τ that maximize ex ante welfare,
ˆ +∞
0
e−ρt [U (τ)+V (m)]dt ,
subject to the single integral constraint in (32). Let λ? denote the Lagrange multiplier on the intertem-




where Ω(m,λ) ≡ V (m)+λπ(m)m measures “liquidity plus seigniorage”. Depending on primitives, m?
may or may not coincide with satiation; that is, the Friedman rule may or may not apply. Regardless
of this, however, tax smoothing obtains and the optimal fiscal policy is determined in exactly the same
fashion as in Barro (1979).
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Another, subtler point is that the m? characterized above necessarily attains the global maximum of
Ω(m,λ). By contrast, this is not necessarily true in our context. In particular, under the Auxiliary As-
sumptions introduced in Section 3.3, it is true that b? is unique and maximizes Ω(b,λ?). But without
these assumption, it is possible that there are multiple steady states, or even a unique steady state that
attains a local minimum of Ω. And while we don’t view this possibility as practically relevant, it does
reinforce our point about how the optimal provision of liquidity is intertwined with the transitional dy-
namics, or the desire to smooth taxes.
C.4 Relation to Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998)
In this Appendix we discuss why the solution strategy followed in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) both
fails to recognize this trade off and offers a distorted answer to the question of interest.
That paper allows for more realistic micro-foundations than ours, including concave utility and an
empirically calibrated labor-income risk. The role played by public debt is fundamentally similar (it
eases the underlying borrowing constraint), but the wealth heterogeneity is a relevant state variable for
aggregate outcomes, forcing the authors not only to rely on numerical simulations but also to take a
certain short-cut. Instead of solving the problem of a Ramsey planner who chooses the dynamic path
of taxes and debt so as to maximize ex-ante utility, they restrict taxes and debt to be constant over time,
abstract from transitional dynamics, and maximize welfare in steady state.
Replicating this strategy in our framework means maximizing U (s)+V (b) subject to R(b)b = g+s. Let




V (b)− λ̂R(b)b} , (34)
This underscores how the Aiyagari-McGrattan approach treats the interest payments on public debt,
R(b)b, as a cost. But as first highlight in Section 4.1, the component ρb of these interest-rate payments




V (b)+λ?π(b)b} , (35)
which underscores that the correct planning problem treats debt issuance as a profit-generating busi-
ness to the tune of π(b)b.
In summary, the solution strategy Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) not only abstracts from transitional
dynamics (or, relatedly, the optimal response to shocks) but also offers a distorted perspective on op-
timal long-run quantity of public debt. At the same time, Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) allow for an
interesting economic effect that our main analysis abstract from: that public debt may crowds out cap-
ital accumulation by offering a substitute form of buffer stock. We explain why this possibility, or even
the opposite one, does not fundamentally change the policy problem in Section 4.1 in the main text.
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Finally, note that discussion here presumes, like the analysis in Section 3.3, that the Auxiliary As-
sumptions hold. As explained in Appendix B.3, the economy may feature multiple steady states when
these assumptions do not hold. In these circumstances, the Aiyagari-McGrattan approach will never
detect this multiplicity, for it is the (generically) unique solution to a static optimization problem.
55
D Main Text Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of part (i) of the proposition proceeds in two steps. The first step
show how to represent the individual’s problem as one in which the level of assets enters the utility func-
tion. The second solves for the equilibrium in the morning and afternoon markets and shows how to
express the resulting welfare and the equilibrium price of public debt as functions of the quantity of
public debt.




βt (ci t +θu(xi t )−ν(hi t ))
]




)≤ ξwt hde fi t +ai t
−ai t+1 ≤ ξwt+1hde fi t+1
Assuming a zero tax rate when there is default, the labor supply in the event of default solves
ν′(hde fi t ) = (1−ξ)wt
because the marginal utility of the afternoon consumption good, and hence the Lagrange multiplier
associated to the budget constraint, is 1. Using the fact that the equilibrium wage rate is A, the two
financial constraints can be written as
zi t ≤φ+ai t
ai t ≥−φ
















Consider now the sub problem of determining the demand for the morning good. This problem is purely









which gives x =X (a,θ, p) and an indirect utility net of the cost of purchasing u(a,θ, p) = θu (X (a,θ, p))−
pX (a,θ, p). Defining the discounted expected indirect utility of the morning good as
U (a,θ, p) ≡β
ˆ
u(a,θ′, p)ϕ(θ′|θ)dθ′






c̃i t −ν(hi t )+U (ai t+1,θt , pt+1)
)]
s.t . c̃i t +qt ai t+1 = ai t + (1−τt )wt hi t
ai t+1 ≥−φ
The utility U (ai t+1,θt , pt+1) will be used in the next part of the proof. This concludes the first part of the
proof.
Step 2. Because the utility is linear in the afternoon good, the optimal savings decision of every agent
in any period t is independent of her initial asset position. This implies that, for any t , the set of im-
plementable next-period wealth distribution, the next-period allocation of the morning good, and the
prices qt and pt+1 is independent of the period-t wealth distribution. It follows that we can split the
planner’s in two parts: an “inner” problem for each period t , where the planner solves for the best imple-
mentable allocation of the risk-free asset and the morning good, taking as given the aggregate quantity
of public debt; and an “outer” problem over all t , where the planner solves for the optimal path of public
debt and taxes.







x(θ)ϕ(θ)dθ = ē (37)
ˆ
a(θ−)ϕ(θ−)dθ− = b (38)
φ+a(θ−)−p(x(θ)− ē)> 0 ∀(θ,θ−) (39)
θu′(x(θ))> p ∀θ (40)[
θu′(x(θ))−p][φ+a(θ−)−p(x(θ)− ē)]= 0 ∀(θ,θ−) (41)
a(θ−)+φ> 0 ∀θ− (42)




]= 0 ∀θ− (44)
In this problem, x(θ) stands for xi ,t+1 = x(θi ,t+1), a(θ−) stands for ai ,t+1 = a(θi ,t ), p stands for pt+1, q
stands for qt , and b stands for bt+1. Letting the planner choose the functions (x, a) means that we let
her choose the cross-sectional allocation of the risk-free asset and the morning good during period t +1.
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This choice is not free as the planner must respect the feasibility and implementability constraints stated
in conditions (37) through (44): conditions (37) and (38) are the resource constraint for the morning
good and the clearing condition for the asset market; conditions (39)-(44) are the household’s optimality
conditions for morning consumption and asset holdings, together with the associated collateral con-
straints and complementary slackness conditions. Finally, note that (36) is simply the ex-ante utility of
the morning good. It follows that the solution to (36)-(44) identifies the best cross-sectional allocation
of asset holdings and morning-good consumption among those that can be implemented as an equilib-
rium whenever bt+1 = b, along with the corresponding prices.34
Now take any path for {τt ,bt } that is part of an equilibrium. If there exists a unique equilibrium with
this path for taxes and debt, the above problem simply returns the associated allocation of the morning
good and the risk-free asset. And if there exist multiple such equilibria, the above problem selects the
best one (i.e., the one that maximizes ex-ante utility).
For any b, let P (b) be the resulting value for p; Q(b) be the resulting value for q ; and letπ(b) ≡Q(b)−β.
Next, note that welfare (ex-ante utility) is given, from step 1, by
W ≡ E0
[∑
βt (ci t +θi t u(xi t )−ν(hi t ))
]
.
By the preceding argument we have that E0[θi t u(xi t )] equals
1
βV (bt ) along the best implementable allo-
cation. Strictly speaking, the last statement is valid for t > 1 but not for t = 0. This is because the wealth
distribution in period 0 is exogenous and does not have to coincide with the one obtained by the solu-
tion to (36)-(44) when b = b0. That is, if we let V0 denote the value of E[θi 0u(xi 0)] attained at the period-0
equilibrium allocation of the morning good, whatever this is, we have that, in general, V0 6= V (b0). To
simplify the notation, we impose V0 = V (b0). This is a completely innocuous constant for our results,



















In addition, we know that E[ci t ] equals aggregate consumption, ct , and all agents supply the same amount
of labor, hi t = ht , due to the quasi-linearity in preferences. We infer that, once we have solved the afore-




βt [ct −ν(ht )+V (bt+1)] (45)
which completes the part (i) of the proof.
34One potentially confusing point in the definition of the above problem is the following: the problem allows the planner to
choose the allocation of the morning good; but it also uses the function Ua (a(θ−),θ−, p), which itself embeds the individual’s
optimal consumption of the morning good. Are the two elements consistent? Yes, because the individual’s optimality and
feasibility conditions are themselves included in the constraints of the problem.
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The properties reported in part (ii) can be proved by considering the first best allocation of the morn-
ing good.
θu′(x FB(θ)) = p FP (46)ˆ
x FB(θ)φ(θ)dθ = e (47)
Note that at the first best allocation, debt is priced at the discount fact such that q = β and accordingly
π(b) = 0. Let us consider the agent with the highest type, θ. At this allocation the borrowing constraint
has to be satisfied for this individual
φ+a(θ−)+p FP(x FB(θ)−e)> 0
Integrating over the previous period type, θ−, we get
φ+
ˆ
a(θ−)ϕ(θ−)dθ−+p FP(x FB(θ)−e)> 0
Using the market clearing condition ˆ
a(θ−)ϕ(θ−)dθ− = b
The condition rewrites
φ+b +p FP(x FB(θ)−e)> 0
Then there exists a debt level, bbli ss , such that
φ+bbli ss +p FP(x FB(θ)−e) = 0
Note that the optimal consumption decision (46) implies that the constraint is slack for any θ < θ. In
other words, for any b > bbli ss , the constraint never binds for any type θ ∈ (θ,θ) implying that π(b) = 0
and V (b) = Vbli ss ≡ V (bbl i ss). By the same token, for any b < bbli ss , there exists θ̃ ∈ (θ,θ) such that the
constraint binds for any θ ∈ [θ̃,θ), implying that π(b) > 0 and V (b) <Vbl i ss .
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Proposition 1 implicitly defines the optimal problem of the planner as
max




βt (ct −ν(ht )+V (bt+1)
]
qt bt+1 = bt + g t −τt Aht
qt =β+π(bt+1)
ct + g t = Aht
v ′(ht ) = (1−τt )A
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Note that the only implementability constraint that has not already been incorporated in V and Q is the
one for the supply of labor
ν′(ht ) = (1−τt )A (48)
Let us further simplify the planner’s problem by solving (48) and the resource constraint for consumption
and labor supply as functions of the tax rate. More specifically, let H(τ) ≡ (ν′)−1 (1−τA ) and S(τ) ≡ τAH(τ)
denote the equilibrium values of, respectively, labor supply and tax revenue, as functions of the tax rate.
Note that it is straightforward to check that S is single-peaked—i.e., there is a Laffer curve—and attains
its maximum value, s̄, at τ= τ̄ for some τ̄ ∈ (0,1). For any s ≤ s̄, we thus have that, whenever the planner
wishes to collect tax revenue equal to s, the tax rate that implements this goal is given by τ = T (s) ≡
min{τ : S(τ) = s}. Let U (s) ≡ AH(T (s))−ν(H(T (s))) measure the resulting utility from consumption and
leisure, as a function of tax revenue, and note that U (s) is decreasing in s, reflecting the welfare cost of






βt (U (st )+V (bt+1)
]
qt bt+1 = bt + g t − st
where qt =β+π(bt+1).
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Assumption B3 corresponds to the case g > ĝ of Lemma 5, such that Ψbl i ss >
γbl i ss . Then Proposition 11 applies and establishes part (i) of the theorem.
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us define Ω(b,λ∗) = V (b)+λ∗π(b)b, where λ∗ =U ′(s∗) and s∗ solves s∗+
π(b∗)b∗ = g + r b∗. Note first that
Ωb(b,λ
∗) = (σ(b)−1)π(b)[γ(b)−λ∗]
Let us then recall that, in our benchmark a steady-state level, b∗ below bbl i ss exists if and only if ψbl i ss >
γbl i ss , and it is then unique. Furthermore, the single-peakedness of π(b)b guarantees that σ(b) < 1 and
γ(b) < 0 for all b < bsei g n , whereas σ(b) > 1 and γ(b) > 0 for all b > bsei g n . Finally, the monotonicity of γ
guarantees that γ(b) > γ(b∗) for b ∈ (bsei g n ,b∗), whereas γ(b) < γ(b∗) = λ∗. Together with the fact that
γ(b∗) =ψ(b∗) =λ∗ > 0, this implies thatΩb(b,λ∗) > 0 for all b ∈ [b,b∗) andΩb(b,λ∗) < 0 for all b ∈ [b,b∗),
which proves that b∗ solves b∗ = ar g maxbΩ(b,λ∗) where λ∗ =ψ(b∗) and hence part (i).
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4. As stated in the text, the borrowing constraints are now affected by the presence
of the capital stock. This implies that the program defined by the system 36–44 now includes the capital
stock, and is completed by the first order condition on capital holdings. The solution of the problem
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then gives both the price of capital, the level of capital and the price of bond as a function of public
debt. The optimal labor decision implies that ht = H(τt ) such that the disutility of labor takes the form
U (τt ) = v(H(τt )). The budget constraint of the government then reads
qt bt+1 = bt + g t −τt AH(τt ) ⇐⇒Q(bt+1)bt+1 = bt + g t −S(τt )
The aggregate resource constraint of the model implies that ct = f (kt )−kt+1 − g . Hence, relying on the




βt (ct − v(ht )+V (bt+1)













β f (kt+1)− g t −kt+1 −U (τt )v
)+ f (k0)






βgc (bt )− g t −kt+1 −U (τt )+V (bt+1
)+ f (k0)




βt (V (bt+1)−U (τt ))+ f (k0)+ f (gk (b0))−
gk (b0)
β
where V (b) ≡V (b)+βgc (b)− g . The crowding out effect is a direct consequence of the first order condi-
tion on capital and the properties of functions f (·) and π(·).
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The proposition is a direct consequence of the fact that λ̇λ =π> 0.
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6. See discussion in main text.
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 7. See discussion in main text.
Q.E.D. 





θ f (k,n)+ (1−δ)k −pk −wn]
subject to z ≤φ+a +ξk k +ξyθ f (k,n)
z = p(k −κ)
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Using the second constraint in the first one, and defining x ≡ a + pκ, as the net worth in period t , we
obtain that the profit of the entrepreneur net of investment and labor costs is
ω(x, p, w ;θ) ≡ max
k≥0,n≥0
[
θ f (k,n)+ (1−δ)k −pk −wn]
subject to pk ≤φ+x +ξk k +ξyθ f (k,n)
The production plan consists of the demand for labor, n(x, p, w ;θ), and the demand for capital, k(x, p, w ;θ).
The aggregate quantities are
n(x, p, w) =
ˆ
n(x, p, w ;θ)ϕ(θ)dθ (49)
k(x, p, w) =
ˆ
k(x, p, w ;θ)ϕ(θ)dθ (50)




βt (ci t −ν(hi t ))
]
s.t. ci t +κi t+1 +qt ai t+1 = ai t +ptκi t + (1−τt )wt hi t +ωi t
where we assumed that ai t < φ+κi t . ωi t denotes the profit received by household i . Note that (i) due
to the linearity of the utility of consumption, all households supply the same amount of hours; and (ii)
E[ci t ] is aggregate consumption, ct . Use the asset market clearing condition
´
ai t di = bt , let κt ≡
´
κi t di
denote aggregate investment, and define
Ω(x, p, w) ≡β
ˆ
ω(x, p, w ;θ)ϕ(θ)dθ.




βt (ct −ν(ht ))
s.t. ct +κt+1 +qt bt+1 = bt +ptκt + (1−τt )wt ht +Ω(xt , pt , wt )
where xt = bt +ptκt . The first order conditions are given by
ν′(ht ) = (1−τt )wt (51)
qt =β(1+Ωx (xt+1, pt+1, wt+1)) (52)
1 =β(1+Ωx (xt+1, pt+1, wt+1)pt+1) (53)
where the last two conditions imply that pt+1 = 1/qt , reflecting arbitrage between financial assets and
physical capital. Notwithstanding this fact, the interest rate is lower than 1/β whenΩx (·) > 0.
Clearing the labor and capital markets (ht = nt and kt = κt ) implies
ν′(n(bt +pt kt , pt , wt )) = (1−τt )wt
kt = k(bt +pt kt , pt , wt )
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which can be solved for the wage w(bt ,kt ,τt ) and the price of capital p(bt ,kt ,τt ). Using them in the
aggregate decisions for labor and capital, we have
ht = H(bt ,τt ) and kt = K (bt ,τt ) (54)
so that
wt =W (bt ,τt ) and pt = P (bt ,τt ) (55)
Likewise, using the resource constraint, we get
ct = θ f (kt ,nt )+ (1−δ)kt −kt+1 − g = C̃ (bt ,τt )−kt+1 (56)











which can be written as ∞∑
t=0
βt W (τt ,bt )+ K (b0,τ0)
β
Likewise, using the preceding results in (52), we get
qt =Q(τt+1,bt+1)
τt wt ht − g = τt W (bt ,τt )H(bt ,τt )− g = S(τt ,bt )
and the government budget is
Q(τt+1,bt+1)bt+1 = bt −S(τt ,bt )





βt W (τt ,bt )
s.t . Q(τt+1,bt+1)bt+1 = bt −S(τt ,bt )
Q.E.D. 
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E A Simple Analytic Example
In this appendix, we use a simplified version of our model to obtain a sharper characterization of the
functions (V ,π) and of the optimal long-run level of public debt. This example uses log utility for the
morning good and two types.










ci ,t +pi ,t xi ,t +qt bi ,t+1 = bi ,t + (1−τt )wt hi ,t +pt ēi (58)
pt (xi ,t −ei )6 ξ+bi ,t (59)
where u(x) = log x and θi t is i.i.d., drawn from the binary support {θH ,θL}, for some θH > θL > 0. Letϕ be
the share of high types in the population and, to simplify the exposition, set θL = 1, θH = ϑ > 1, eH = 0,
and eL = ē/(1−φ). The rest of the notation is identical to that used in Section 2.1.
In equilibrium, the borrowing constraint (59) can bind at most for the high type. Letting µt be the
associated multiplier, we can thus write the conditions that characterize the equilibrium in the market
for the afternoon good in period t as follows:
ϑu′(xH t ) = pt (1+µt ) (60)
u′(xLt ) = pt (61)
pt xH t ≤ ξ+bt (62)
µt ≥ 0 (63)
µt (ξ+bt −pt (xH t − ē)) = 0 (64)
ϕxH t + (1−ϕ)xLt = ē (65)
The Euler condition for the optimal savings in period t , on the other hand, reduces to
πt ≡ qt −β=βϕµt+1 ≥ 0 (66)
Let (x∗H , x
∗
L ) denote the first-best allocation. This solves
ϑu′(x∗H ) = u′(x∗L ) (67)
ϕx∗H + (1−ϕ)x∗L = ē (68)
and trivially satisfies x∗H > ē > x∗L and ∂x∗H /∂ϑ > 0 > ∂x∗L /∂ϑ. In particular, using the assumption u(x) =









Clearly, this allocation can be attained in equilibrium if and only if
pt =ϑu′(x∗H ) and pt x∗H ≤ ξ+bt .
Therefore, if we define
bbl i ss ≡ϑu′(x∗H )x∗H −ξ=ϑ−ξ,
we immediately have that bt ≥ bbli ss is sufficient for the borrowing constraint not to bind (µt = 0) and
the first best allocation to obtain.
And conversely, when bt < bbli ss , the first best allocation is unattainable, the borrowing constraint
binds, and the equilibrium yields
xH t = (b +ξ)ē
ϕ(b +ξ−1)+1 e, xLt =
(ϕ+1)ē
ϕ(b +ξ−1)+1 , and µ=
ϑ−b −ξ
b +ξ+φ−1 .
Using the definition of bbli ss , we can rewrite the above as
xH t = ē(bt −bbliss +ϑ)
ϕ(bt −bbliss +ϑ)+1−ϕ
, xLt = ē
ϕ(bt −bbliss +ϑ)+1−ϕ
, and µt = (bbliss −bt )
ϑ− (bbliss −bt )
,
which makes clear how the equilibrium allocation converges monotonically to the first-best counterpart,
and how µt converges monotonically to 0 from above, as bt converges to bbl i ss from below.
Using these results, we then also have the following closed-form solution for (V ,π) : for b ≥ bbli ss ,
π(b) = 0 and V (b) =Vbl i ss , where
Vbli ss ≡β
{
ϕϑu(x∗H )+ (1−ϕ)u(x∗L )
}=β{v − (ϕϑ+1−ϕ) log(ϕϑ+1−ϕ)}
and v ≡ (ϕϑ+1−ϕ) log(e); and for b < bbl i ss ,




V (b) =β{v +ϕϑ log(ϑ+b −bbliss)− (1−ϕ+ϕϑ) log(ϕ(ϑ+b −bbliss)+1−ϕ)} .
We therefore reach the following result:
Lemma 6. Suppose ξ<ϑ. There exists a threshold bbl i ss > 0, given by bbl i ss =ϑ−ξ, such that the following
properties hold for all b < bbl i ss :
π(b) > 0, π′(b) < 0, π′′(b) > 0,
V (b) <Vbli ss , V ′(b) > 0, V ′′(b) < 0.
For b ≥ bbli ss , on the other hand, π(b) = 0 and V (b) = Vbl i ss . Finally, a tighter financial friction, or lower
private collateral (lower ξ), increases bbli ss and uniformly raises both V (b) and π(b) for all b < bbl i ss .
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Proof. The properties of π and V with respect to b follow directly from their closed-form characteriza-
tion. And the effect of ξ follows from the fact that bbl i ss =ϑ−ξ along with the fact that, for any bbli ss and
any b < bbli ss , π and V are increasing in bbl i ss and otherwise invariant to ξ.
Consider now the problem introduced in Section 2.4, which as shown in Section 4.1 also character-





whereΩ(b,λ) ≡V (b)+λπ(b)b and λ> 0. The following result can then be shown.
Lemma 7. π(b)b and Ω(b,λ) are strictly concave in b ∈ [0,bbl i ss] and their maxima satisfy at 0 < bsei g n <
b∗ < bbli ss .
Proof. Consider g (b) ≡π(b)b and note that
g ′(b) =π(b)+π′(b)b and g ′′(b) = 2π′(b)+π′′(b)b
Using the fact that π′′(b) =−2π′(b)b+ξ , we get that
g ′′(b) = 2π′(b) ξ
b +ξ < 0
which proves that g (b) ≡π(b)b is concave. Next, note that g ′(0) =βϕϑ−ξξ > 0 and g ′(bbli ss) =π′(bbli ss)bbl i ss =
−βϕϑ−ξθ < 0. It follows that bsei g n is the unique solution to g ′(b) = 0 and is strictly between 0 and bbli ss .
Consider nowΩ(b,λ) ≡V (b)+λπ(b)b. Its concavity follows directly from the concavity of V (b), which
was established in the previous result, and the concavity of g (b) = π(b)b, which was just established. It
follows that b∗ is the unique solution to ∂Ω(b,λ)/∂b = 0. Furthermore, because g ′(bsei g n) = 0, g ′(bbl i ss) <
0, V ′(bsei g n) > 0, and V ′(bbl i ss) = 0, we have that ∂Ω(b,λ)/∂b > 0 at b = bsei g n and ∂Ω(b,λ)/∂b < 0 at
b = bbliss, and therefore that b∗ is strictly between bsei g n and bbliss.
This result echoes the properties we establish in Section 3 for the steady state. But because we now
have a simple closed-form characterization ofΩ, we can go a step further to study the comparative statics
of b∗ with respect to the underlying primitives. Using our closed-form solution for π and V along with




(b +ξ)(ϕ(b +ξ)+1−ϕ) +λ
βϕξ






=λg ′(b∗) < 0
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by the fact that b∗ > bsei g n . Applying the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT), we then have that
∂b?
∂θ



















(β+ξ)2 changes sign with the position of b relative to ξ, the
effect of ξ on b∗ is generally ambiguous. In particular, we have found numerically that b∗ is inversely
U-shaped with respect to ξ.
Proposition 16. The optimal quantity of public debt increases with the size of the liquidity shocks (θ),
decreases with the value of fiscal space (λ), and is generally non-monotonic in the amount of private col-
lateral (ξ) .
Although b∗ can be decreasing in ξ, which means that more private collateral can crowd out the
government-provided collateral, there is no complete crowding out: an increase in ξ always increases
total collateral, b∗+ ξ.35 It then also follows that, at the optimal quantity of public debt, more private
collateral depresses the liquidity premium (∂π(b
∗)
∂ξ < 0), whereas the converse is true with an aggravation
of liquidity needs (∂π(b
∗)
∂ϑ > 0).
To conclude, these findings complement the intuitions developed in Section 2.4. Strictly speaking,
they do not apply to the steady state of the infinite-horizon model, because they treat λ as exogenous.
But we can use the government budget evaluated at the steady state to obtainλ as an increasing function
of b, an increasing function of g , and a decreasing function of π (and thereby a decreasing function of θ
and an increasing function of ξ). We can then readily translate the result to the steady-state level of debt,
modulo the replacement of λ with g . That is, the value of fiscal space is re-parameterized by g , but the
comparative statics with respect to ϑ and ξ go through.
35To see this, let z ≡ b +ξ and re-express V , π, andΩ as functions of z instead of b :
π(b) = π̃(z) ≡βϕϑ− z
z
V (b) = Ṽ (z) ≡β{v +ϕϑ log(z)− (1−ϕ+ϕϑ) log(ϕz +1−ϕ}
Ω(b,λ) = Ω̃(z,λ) ≡ Ṽ (z)+λπ̃(z)(z −ξ)
Because Ṽ and π̃ are invariant to ξ, it is immediate that ∂
2Ω̃
∂z∂ξ = −λπ̃′(z) > 0, which via the IFT implies that z∗ ≡
argmaxz Ω̃(z,λ) = b∗ + ξ increases with ξ. In fact, because the property that V and π are invariant to ξ conditional on z ap-
plies generally, so does the result that z∗ increases with ξ.
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